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The  paper  discusses  the  possibility  that  the  workings  of the  financial  system 
contributed to the boom-bust cycle in the Finnish credit market since the mid-1980s. 
We begin with a review of the most prominent theoretical arguments about the role 
of "financial factors".  Also  the  main findings  of a vast empirical literature  are 
summed up. This is followed by a description of the salient features of the Finnish 
credit cycle and the associated banking crisis. The evolution of credit stocks and 
interest rates are then analyzed on a relatively high level of aggregation from the 
perspective of the theoretical arguments discussed. The main conclusions are: First, 
changes in the balance sheets of firms and households very likely contributed to both 
the rapid growth of credit in the late  1980s and its subsequent steep contraction. 
Second, the observations are also consistent with the conjecture that supply of bank 
credit very likely increased in the late 1980s and contracted in the early 1990s relative 
to other sources of credit. Third, some differences observed in the behaviour of 
different bank groups suggest that moral hazard related to underpriced bank liabilities 
may have contributed to the growth of  lending in the boom period, and problems with 
capital adequacy may have constrained bank lending in the early 1990s. Stylized facts 
are consistent with these conjectures. However, to reliably infer about these moral 
hazard and credit crunch hypotheses, in-depth analysis of bank behaviour with micro 
data is required. Similarily, ascertaining the role of borrower balance sheets requires 
analysis of borrowers with different characteristics. 
Keywords:  credit cycle,  financial  factors,  lending policies,  moral  hazard,  credit 
crunch 
Tiivistelma 
Paperissa tarkastellaan sita, aiheuttiko rahoitusjarjestelman toiminta osaltaan luotto-
jen nopean laajenemisen 1980-luvun jalkipuoliskolla ja sita seuranneen luottokanto-
jen romahduksen. Aluksi kaydaan lyhyesti lapi tarkeimmat teoreettiset argumentit 
"rahoitustekijoiden" merkityksesta. Samalla esitetaan tiivistetty arvio rahoitustekijoi-
den roolia koskevasta laajasta empiirisesta kirjallisuudesta. Sitten seuraa Suomen 
luottosyklinja siihen liittyvan pankkikriisin keskeisten piirteiden kuvaus, jonkajal-
keen tarkastellaan luottojen ja korkojen kehitysta aggregoidulla tasolla aiemrnin esilla 
olleiden teoreettisten selitysten valossa. Tarkeimmat johtopaaWkset ovat: Y  ritysten 
ja kotitalouksien taserakenteiden muutoksilla oli varsin todennakoisesti luotonlaajen-
3 nusta lisliliva vaikutus 1980-luvun lopullaja vastaavasti sita supistava vaikutus 1990-
luvun alussa. Toiseksi havainnot tukevat myos kasitysta, etta pankkien luotontarjonta 
lisaantyi  1980-1uvun  lopulla ja supistui  1990-luvun  alussa  verrattuna  muihin 
luottollihteisiin. Kolmanneksi eraat seikat viittaavat siihen, etta pankkien velkojen 
alihinnoitteluun liittyva moral hazard -ilrnio on saattanut myotavaikuttaa luotonannon 
nopeaan kasvuun 1980-1uvun lopulla. Vastaavasti pankkien paaomaongelmat ovat 
voineet  rajoittaa  luotonantoa  1990-luvun  alussa.  Karkeat  havainnot  eivat  ole 
ristiriidassa nliiden paatelrnien kanssa. Luotettava paattely moral hazardia ja luotto-
lamaa koskevista hypoteeseista edellyttaa kuitenkin yksityiskohtaista analyysia pank-
kikohtaisella aineistolla. Samoin lainanottajien taseiden merkityksesta varrnisturninen 
edellyttaa eri tilanteissa olleiden velallisten kayttaytyrnisen analyysia. 
A  vainsanat: luottosykli, rahoitustekijat, luotonanto, moral hazard, luottolama 
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5 1  Introduction 
In many developed market economies the latter half of the 1980s was char.acterized 
by exceptionally rapid expansion of credit, rise of asset prices and aggregate output 
to be followed by equally exceptional banking problems and stagnation or fall of 
credit stocks,  asset prices  and  output and  employment.  The recovery from  the 
recessions has also been slower than usually has been the case. The most prominent 
examples of this  type of cycle are  (parts  of)  the United States, Japan, Norway, 
Sweden, Finland. Also in United Kingdom and France similar developments have 
been observed, although in a lesser degree. In terms of output and employment losses 
Finland has experienced the most severe recession in the recent history of the OEeD 
countries.  Also the banking problems  have been among the  severest if not the 
severest. 
In public discussion malfunctioning of financial system has often times been 
made the culprit for both the "overheating" and the exceptional depth and duration 
of  the  subsequent  recession.  "Excessive"  growth  of  credit  resulting  in 
"overindebtedness" has been claimed to have caused or at least facilitated a period 
of unsustainable growth. This was followed by a period of low aggregate demand 
associated with a voluntary or forced consolidation of balance sheets. Furthermore, 
"credit crunch" due to capital shortages of the financial intermediaries, "excessive" 
risk aversion by bank managers or misguided regulatory stringency has been named 
as a significant contributing factor to the ensued recession and slow recovery. Thus 
the financial system has been implicated if not as  a source of the observed credit 
cycle, at least as a factor that has strongly contributed to the amplitude of the cycle. 
This type of  reasoning is by no means new. It had a prominent role in many early 
analyses of the American Great Depression. Thus Fisher (1933) argued that in all 
major  booms  and  depressions  two  factors  have  been  of central  importance, 
"overindebtedness to start with and deflation following soon after". The process of 
"debt-deflation" ie. the increase in real debt burdens of the borrowers as a result of 
declining prices, leading to lower spending, lower prices and still higher real debt 
burders, was according to Fisher the key factor in the transformation of a downturn 
into Great Depression. 
According to Keynes (1936) investment was largely determined by the "state of 
confidence", which in turn depended on borrower views on the yields of investment 
projects and on  "the state of credit". By the state of credit he meant the degree of 
confidence lenders have on the borrowers' capacity to service debt. All these factors 
were considered highly volatile by Keynes. Later particularly Minsky (eg. 1977) and 
Kindleberger (1978) have described financial cycles and crises with the help of such 
psykological concepts as  "optimism",  "euphoria",  "pessimism", which set in 
motion changes in investment, debt finance, and asset prices, which again feed back 
to the confidence felt by economic agents. The functioning of the financial system 
and the credit relationships created are a central part of their explanation of aggregate 
economic fluctuations, not a passive reflection of more fundamental forces in work. 
Banks as  major suppliers of credit have naturally been identified as  sources of 
instability. 
However,  this  sort  of  analyses  are  in  stark  contrast  with  most  of  the 
macroeconomic  theory  that  has  developed  since  the  Second World War.  The 
neoclassical ISLM models that were the mainstream of macroeconomics until the 
7 1970s and still constitute the backbone of undergraduate macroeconomic textbooks 
allow no role for the financial system with the exception of the creation of medium 
of  exchange, money. The models contain typically only two imperfectly substitutable 
financial assets,  money and bonds.  Given the Walras' law, bond market can be 
supressed from the analysis. Therefore, the financial system consists effectively of 
"the money market". Although deposit money may be created by a private banking 
system, such money is assumed to be a perfect substitute for the base money that is 
a liability of the government. The role of "inside debt" ie. borrowing by a private 
agent from  another is  strictly limited to  that of bank deposits.  Bank assets  are 
equivalent to government bonds. 
In these  models,  economic fluctuations  stem from  autonomous  changes  in 
demand components or money. Assuming rigidity of prices and wages implies that 
also real quantities ie. output and employment vary in response to changes in the 
exogenous  variables.  The  financial  system  of the  model,  the  money  market, 
determines  "the rate of  interest" by the interplay of supply of  and demand for money. 
Consequently, the  only way  this  very simple financial  system can  orininate  or 
propagate economic fluctuations relate to the demand for and supply of money. 
Notwithstanding the emphasis by Keynes of the instability of the  "speculative" 
element of money demand in response to volatile expectations, the ISLM model 
builds on a stable demand for money function. Thus cyclical variation of real or 
nominal quantities is not governed by chocks to money demand. 1 This leaves money 
supply  the  only  potential  financial  market  variable  that  can  affect  aggregate 
outcomes. If  it is assumed that money supply is perfectly controlled by the monetary 
authority, only policy shocks can move the interest rate and the consequently the 
demand components depend on the rate of  interest. But money supply may not remain 
stable in the absence of  active policy. The empirical counterpart of the ISLM model's 
money stock consists largely of deposits supplied by private banks. And it is possible 
that the supply of bank deposits varies independently of monetary policy. 
In  their  detailed  account  of monetary  developments  in  the  United  States, 
Friedman and Schwarz (1963) not only claim that changes in money supply have in 
a major way affected output but also that banking panics have resulted in significant 
declines in the deposit component of  money stock. This claim implies that even if  one 
abstracts  away  from  all  other private  debt  instruments  than bank deposits,  the 
functioning of the financial system can lead to variation in the rate of interest and 
thereby also in aggregate outcomes. The origin of the effect is banking panics, which 
may force banks to close down and thereby contract supply of deposits. However, the 
problem is in principle easy to handle if the monetary authority keeps up the total 
money supply by increasing the supply of  base money. According to Friedman and 
Schwarz, the failure to  maintain sufficient money supply in the face  of banking 
panics was the distinctive factor that translated the recession of the early 1930s into 
the Great Depression. Extension of credit and a subsequent debt-deflation has no role 
in the explanation. 
1 Policy analysis based on the ISLM framework may incorporate a degree of instability of the money 
demand function in recognition that every theory is only an approximation of "reality". But then the 
issue is just one of monetary control ie. the need of the monetary authority to know whether a given 
change in the money stock is a reflection of a change in the arguments of the money demand function, 
a random flip or perhaps due to a change in the supply of bank money. 
8 This absence of the role of credit is characteristic also for a substantial body of 
modern theories  that seek to  explain aggregate economic fluctuations  based on 
explicit  optimization  behaviour  of  individual  economic  agents  and  rational 
expectations. The models try to generate plausible patterns of serial correlations and 
cross-correlations of aggregate variables such as output, employment, price level, real 
wage etc. in response to shocks to production technology, to preferences, and in some 
cases to money. Many of these models assume complete markets, perfect competion 
and fully flexible prices. 
Most of the so-called real business cycle models either abstract away from all 
financial market considerations including money or incorporate a purely passive 
money ie. a quantity that responds to demand for transactions services.2 Some, like 
the monetary business cycle models by Lucas (1972) and Barro (1976) allow money 
to affect demand while retaining full fexibility of all nominal quantities. The central 
prediction of these models is that anticipated changes in money do not have any real 
consequences, while unanticipated shocks to money create temporary movements in 
output and other real variables. As in practice information about money stock can be 
assumed good, these models give little scope for monetary shocks to create business 
cycles.  Allowing rigidities in  prices  or in wages  increases  possibilities for real 
consequences of monetary shocks? 
However, in the past 10 years or so an increasing number of models aiming at 
explaining macroeconomic fluctuations have incorporated a financial system much 
richer than that just producing money.  Most of these models give private debt, 
balance sheet structures and financial intermediaries an important role in magnifying 
the  effects  of various  shocks  so  as  to  lead to  potentially  substantial  aggregate 
fluctuations. In some analyses even shocks to financial intermediation can precipitate 
real consequences. In the following  sections 2 and  3 these ideas are  discussed. 
Empirical  evidence reported  in  the  literature  about  their  significance is  briefly 
reviewed in section 4. Section 5 then provides a description of the salient features of 
the Finnish boom-bust cycle and preliminary interpretations of the cycle from the 
point of  view of the discussed financial intermediation theories. The interpretations 
are based on aggregate level behaviour of credit stocks and interest rates augmented 
with some observations about the evolution of  bank lending by different bank groups. 
2 Examples of models that abstract away all financial elements are Kydland and Prescott (1982) and 
Long and Plosser (1983). A purely passive money appears in King and Plosser (1984). 
3 Price rigidities are incorporated for example in Fischer (1977) and Taylor (1980) and wage rigidities 
in Phelps and Taylor (1977). 
9 2  Why financial factors may matter:  some partial 
equilibrium arguments 
2.1  Imperfect information as a source of frictions 
In all developed economies there exist substantial amounts of  private debt and a large 
variety of financial instruments, firms' capital structures vary a great deal and the 
financial system uses non-trivial amounts of resources. Therefore, abstracting away 
from these facts in macroeconomic analysis is associated with a notion of smooth, 
frictionless functioning of the financial system. 
A  prerequisite  for  the  smooth  functioning  of the  financial  system  is  that 
transactions costs are small relative to the value obtained from financial transacting. 
Some economists  have  questioned  this.  Gurley  and  Shaw  (1955)  thus  argued 
essentially on the grounds of transaction costs that the financial system is not just a 
veil on real transactions but also affects their outcomes. However, whatever the merit 
of such arguments may have been earlier, it seems rather difficult to  argue that 
transctions costs, at least in the normal rather narrow meaning of the word, could be 
a significant factor given the rapid progress of information technology. 
Much more important is likely be the degree of knowledge economic agents 
have  about many relevant aspects  with regard to  financial  contracts,  which by 
definition  deal  with  uncertain  future  contingencies.  The  notion  of a  smoothly 
functioning financial system is in effect based on the idea that despite uncertainty 
about future circumstances, agents can agree and complete transactions concerning 
all possible contingencies. Under the assumptions of symmetric information and 
complete  markets,  financial  transactions  can  be  conducted  just  as  any  other 
transactions. 
A basic result under the assumption of complete financial markets is that the 
value of a firm is independent of its capital structure in the absence of bankruptcy 
costs4  or external frictions such as  taxes (Modigliani and Miller 1958). Thus the 
amount debt does not in any way affect the real decisions of a firm. Private debt is 
inconsequential  and  can  therefore  be  ignored  in  aggregate  analysis.  Similarly 
financial intermediaries are irrelevant with complete markets. Fama (1980) shows 
that under such an assumption it is of no consequence whether the investors own 
directly the financial instruments issued by the firms or whether they hold deposits 
of  banks that in turn have the liabilities of the firms as their assets. 
However, if economic agents are not equally informed about all relevant aspects 
of a potential transaction, ie. if information is asymmetric, the results obtained under 
the assumptions of symmetric information and complete markets do not hold. In a 
pathbreaking paper Akerlof (1970) shows how a market can collapse if the seller has 
better information than the buyer of the quality of a good. The asymmetry of infor-
4  In a narrow sense bankruptcy costs comprise the deadweight costs caused by bankruptcy ie. the 
adirninistrative and legal costs of  transfering ownership of  a firm from the shareholders to the creditors. 
Economically also the loss of value due to attempts to avoid bankruptcy may be counted as bankruptcy 
costs: talented employees may  leave, suppliers must be payed more timely,  conflicts of interest 
between management and owners may distract management effort etc. This type of wider bankruptcy 
cost concept may perhaprs better be called "costs of financial distress", see ego  Berger et al. (1995). 
10 mation implies that lowering the price may not induce more demand as the potential 
buyers have a valid reason to expect that only low quality products, "lemons", will 
be sold at low prices. This type of adverse selection may quite well be a rather 
general phenomenon, not limited to Akerlofs example, used cars.  In particular, 
entrepreneurs are likely to know much better the quality of their investment projects 
than outsiders from whom finance may be needed to realize the project. 
Another problem caused by asymmetric  information is  moral  hazard.  The 
behaviour of the user of funds may be unobservable to the provider of the funds. As 
a result an entrepreneur may invest the funds in a riskier project than indicated to the 
lender.5 With limited liability such behaviour is advantageous to the borrower as long 
as the lender does not take into account this incentive of risk taking in the pricing of 
funds. But a rational lender of  course takes precautions against such behaviour, either 
by setting a default premium on funds or by rationing quantitatively the amount of 
funds to be lent. 
Based on these ideas  of adverse selection and moral hazard, a voluminous 
literature has  emerged to  explain why external  finance  is  more expensive than 
internal finance and why in certain circumstances the "lemons premia" can become 
effectively infinite so that some potential borrowers are  altogether denied credit 
(credit rationing). Furthermore, rationing need not be limited to debt finance but may 
also concern equity financing (equity rationing).6 It is however important to notice 
5 A riskier project here means that the return distribution has larger variance while the expected value 
is unchanged, ie. there is a mean-preserving spread of the distribution. 
6  Particularly the literature on  credit rationing is  vast and  in  fact  rather sensitive to  the  precise 
assumptions about informational asymmetries. laffee and Russell (1976) were the first to show how 
adverse selection can lead to credit rationing in the sense that the size of a loan is restricted. The model 
assumes that borrower default probabilities increase with the size of the loan and that they vary at any 
given size across borrowers. The informational asymmetry is that the lender cannot distinguish the 
qualities of the borrowers ex ante. Therefore there is a lemons premium in the lending rate. Good 
borrowers may then prefer small  loan  sizes in order to  lower this  premium and the bad quality 
borrowers have to accept small loans in order not to reveal their type. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) show 
how another type of rationing can emerge due to adverse selection: some of identical borrowers are 
denied loans. In this case the size of the borrower's project is fixed but the variances of the return 
distributions,  which are private information of the borrowers,  vary.  Given limited liability of the 
borrowers and an assumed standard debt contract (the borrower pays a fixed contract rate or in default 
all of  the revenue of  the project), the expected return of  the lender is the smaller, the wider is the return 
distribution of the project, at a given lending rate. This can lead to a situation where higher loan rates 
imply weaker average borrower quality. Therefore the supply curve of loans may bend backwards, and 
in the equilibrium some ofthe borrowers are, arbitrarily, denied loans. Mankiw (1986) highlights the 
possibility of a total collapse of a credit market due to adverse selection. In his model, a rise in the safe 
rate of interest or an increased lender perception of borrower risk may lead to a situation where no 
loans at all are supplied. However, the possibilities for and the nature of credit rationing may be 
significantly affected by the borrower characteristics and the types of contracts that are contemplated. 
Eg.  a sufficient collateral provided by  the borrower may  eliminate credit rationing.  The obvious 
problem  nevertheless  remains  that  the  potential  borrower  may  not  have  enough  collaterizable 
assets.Also allowing dynamic aspects and a banking system consisting of several banks may change 
the results, see the survey of Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993). That adverse selection can lead to 
lemons premia or quantitative constraints on external finance is not limited to debt finance. Myers and 
Majluf (1984) and Greenwald, Stiglitz and Weiss (1984) show that asymmetric information about a 
firm's net worth may constrain the issuance of new equity capital. The problem is that the outside 
investors do not know whether the funds would be profitably used or whether they would be used to 
make the new investors to share in the bad assets of the firm. Therefore the issuance price may contain 
a lemons discount or at an extreme no shares can be issued at all. 
11 that  rationing  ie.  quantitative  restnctIOns  on  external  finance  is  not  the  only 
manifestation  of information-based  friction  in  financial  intermediation.  In less 
extreme cases the effect takes the form of price premium. 
Moral  hazard  can  also  lead  the  "insiders"  of a  firm  (managers,principal 
shareholders) to divert a part of the firm's resources to own consumption or make 
them  limit  management  effort  and  thereby  harm  the  interests  of the  outside 
shareholders. This problem related to equity finance can be alleviated if  the outsiders 
hold debt instruments instead of  equity. In that case the marginal benefit from effort 
and not shirking falls fully to the insiders, and the misalignment of  insider incentives 
vanishes. On the other hand, such a leverage implies that increasing the riskiness of 
the firm's operation benefits the insiders who obtain all profits exceeding the debt 
service while they loose little in the case of bad realizations. Thus both debt and 
equity finance may involve risks to the outside providers of funds. They need to be 
compensated by preemia on such funding. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that 
these types of agency costs lead to  an optimal debt  -equity structure even in the 
absence of taxes, in contrast to the Modigliani-Miller irrelevance result. 
In addition to  the adverse  selection and moral  hazard problems, imperfect 
information may imply an ex post verification problem. The provider of funds may 
not be able to determine the outcome of the project financed without incurring costs. 
And the user of  the funds obviously has the incentive to always report a bad outcome. 
The provider of  the funds has to be compensated for the verification costs. Townsend 
(1979) shows that under "costly state verification", the standard debt contract is an 
optimal arrangement in sense of minimizing the expected verification costs. This 
gives further strength to the analyses concerning ego credit rationing that are based on 
the assumption of a debt contract.7 
2.2  Implication: balance sheets and cash flow matter 
The  theories  discussed  above  suggest  that  on  the  basis  of the  informational 
asymmetries that result in adverse selection, moral hazard, and verification problems, 
the  observed or shadow cost of external  funds  exceeds  that  of internal  funds. 
Furhermore, the smaller is the net worth of a firm, the more difficult it is to align the 
interests of  the external providers of funds and the firm insiders, and the higher is the 
premium on external finance. 
Therefore, the higher is the readily available internal finance in the hands of a 
firm, cash flow, the less there is need to resort to external finance and the lower the 
marginal financial costs. Similarily, the more there are collateralizable assets in the 
firm, the smaller is the premium on external funds. As a consequence, the effects of 
many macroeconomic variables are transmitted through the balance sheet rather 
differently from what would obtain in the absence of informational asymrnetries. A 
neat illustration of  this is provided by Gilchrist, Bernanke and Gertler (1994). In their 
example the difficulties associated with external funding are so severe that only fully 
collateralized borrowing is possible. 
Assume that an entrepreneur commits in period 0 a physical capital stock K 
(durable asset that has alternative uses and can be used as a collateral), and a variable 
7 See ego Gale and Hellwig (1985) and Williamson (1986). 
12 input Xl  (labour, capital that has no value outside the firm or the period) to produce 
output f(xJ in period 1. f(.) is assumed increasing and concave. 
In the beginning of period 0 the entrepreneur has a cash flow from previous 
production f(xo), and an inherited debt obligation robo, where bo is the past borrowing 
and ro is the real rate of  interest on this debt. Therefore, the purchases of the variable 
input Xl  and new borrowing bl are related as follows: 
(1) 
The entrepreneur chooses Xl  and bl in period 0 to maximize output in period 1 net of 
debt service.  Given the  requirement that only fully  collateralized borrowing is 
possible,  the  external  funding  is  constrained  by  the  market  value  of  the 
collateralizable assets: 
(2) 
where ql is the market value of the fixed capital at the end of period 1 and r I is the 
real interest rate on borrowing bl. 
Combining  (1)  and  (2)  implies  that  the  spending  on  variable  input  Xl  is 
constrained by the entrepreneur's net worth, which is the sum of cross cash flow f(xo) 
and net discounted assets (q/rl)K - robo: 
(3) 
The unconstrained amount of spending on the variable input Xl  is defined by the 
marginal condition f(xl) =  r  1. But this can be achieved only if it is not greater than the 
borrower net worth (RHS of eq. 3). When the net worth constraint binds, the shadow 
value of a  marginal unit of internal  funds  is  f(x1), which on  the basis of the 
assumptions on f(.) exceeds the going rate of  interest r  1 in the external capital market. 
r1 should be thought of as a riskless rate, given the requirement that all lending is 
fully collateralized. Furthermore, with a binding net worth constraint, any decline in 
net worth increases the premium on external funds and reduces the entrepreneurs 
spending. 
In the absence of the net worth constraint, only the interest rate r  I  affects the 
spending decision. It is thus this standard cost-of-capital effect, through which all 
shocks moving the real interest rates work. 
However, when the constraint is binding, the effect of the real interest rates is 
different, and asset prices become important as well. An increase in the expected real 
rate of interest r1 reduces spending through its impact on the discounted value of 
collateral. In addition, unlike with no net worth constraints, an increase in the real 
rate applied to the existing debt ro now reduces spending through its impact on the 
burden of debt service. Finally, a decline of asset prices (ql) lowers the value of 
collateral and thus spending. 
Monetary policy transmission depends very much whether or not the net worth 
constraint binds. If  it does not, the standard transmission mechanism is valid: money 
shocks affect the expected real rate of interest ri' and through the cost-of-capital 
mechanism  spending.  However,  if the  net  worth  constarint  is  binding,  the 
transmission mechanism is very different. Now changes in the rate applied to the 
existing stock of credit influences net worth and thus spending. On the other hand, 
13 the interest rate applied to new financial contracts affects spending only through the 
discount factor and asset prices. 
2.3  Implication: financial intermediaries matter 
The idea that information problems may cause frictions in financial intermediation 
can also be used to rationalize the existence of intermediary institutions. There are 
several  ways  in  which  intermediaries  may  alleviate  the  difficulties  caused  by 
information problems. 
First, the intermediaries can evaluate potential borrowers to determine whether 
they are good risks or bad risks. If  the borrowers' projects are large relative to any 
potential lender's resources, the evaluation costs can be economized by delegating the 
evaluation to an institution. Boyd and Prescott (1986) provide an analysis of how 
financial intermediaries, "intermediary coalitions", can be an effient solution for such 
an evalution problem. An essential feature of this coalition is that it is large so that 
it through risk pooling can lower the risks of  its liabilities, and therefore need not be 
evaluated by the ultimate lenders. 
Second, when the information problem is that of verifying the outcome of the 
project for which finance is seeked, an intermediary can be delegated the task of 
monitoring the project outcome. Diamond (1984) and Williamson (1986) show how 
in this context a large financial intermediary emerges as  an efficient monitoring 
agent, whose claims on the investors  are standard debt contracts and who issue 
riskless debt to the ultimate lenders. Again diversification of the idiosycratic risks of 
the borrowers is the reason for why the liabilities of the intermediaries become 
riskless and require no monitoring on the part of the ultimate lenders. However, also 
bank capital can provide a cushion that insulates the depositors from a variation in 
the aggregate returns on bank assets. This mechanism is particularly relevant, if there 
is a systematic component in the return variation of bank assets. In this case, a finite 
intermediary size is implied.8 
Third, somewhat differently, interdiaries can be motivated as a way to allow high 
yielding long-term investments despite the lenders' need to have liquid assets. The 
informational  problem  in  this  case  is  that  a  lender's  liquidity  need  is  private 
information. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) show how a bank issuing demand deposit 
can provide insurance for risk-averse lenders against such liquidity needs while 
allowing long-term investment. The model implies an inherent instability of  this type 
of banking. Expectation by depositors that other depositors would withdraw their 
deposits and force a default of the bank precipitates an early withdrawal. Thus an 
expectation of a bank run can become self-fulfilling.9 
The provision of highly liquid liabilities, demand deposits, is the special feature 
of the intermediaries that are called banks. Combining supply of liquid liabilities and 
information intensive risky lending may be motivated by the advantages of using 
information on the loan customer's transactions account in the monitoring of her 
8 See Winton (1995). 
9 A liquidity based rationale for banks has been constructed also without risk-aversion, see Williamson 
(1988). 
14 performance (Fama 1985). On the other hand, demand deposits can work as a means 
of disciplining bankers in the case of indications of bad performance, and allowing 
such an intrument lowers the cost of capital for the banker.  10 Both arguments suggest 
that the banks supplying liquid liabilities are not by accidenLinthe business of risky 
lending. 
The  existence  of intermediaries  may  also be rationalized  by the  idea that 
intermediaries may help in creating efficient long-term relationships, which would 
not be possible otherwise given the difficulties of writing complete and binding 
contracts.11  Good information about the borrower may allow  an intermediary to 
commit herself to financing the borrower even in bad times. On the other hand, the 
commitment on the part of the borrower to keep the relationship also in good times 
when cheaper financing might be available elsewhere allows such relationships to be 
profitable  for  the  banks.  Obviously  competition  by  outsiders  may  make  such 
arrangements unsustainable.  12 
Finally, in a related way, intermediaries may have a special role in exercising 
control over borrower assets  in the case of default.  In  the absence of complete 
contracts, debt contract may be an  optimal way of allocating control rights, see 
Aghion and Bolton (1992). Banks or other intermediaries in turn may be better in 
exercising such control than - a typically large number of - bondholders, as  the 
I  atters  , involvement may be hampered by free rider problems.  13 
The basic point of the above theories of financial intermediation is that financial 
intermediaries provide valuable service in facilitating financing for high-yielding 
projects that otherwise would not materialize to the same extent. Intermediary and 
particularly bank credit is special in that it cannot easily or perfectly be substituted 
for by other types of finance. Therefore any change in the supply of intermediary 
credit is likely to change the overall supply of credit. 
Furthermore, the theories predict that certain types of firms and projects are 
particularly dependent on financing from banks and other intermediaries. First, firms 
with high net worth relative to the projects need less uncollateralized finance and 
therefore need less evaluation and monitoring. Second, firms that have reputation for 
honoring their financial commitments may not need to be monitored or evaluated, 
and may therefore efficiently use direct finance from ultimate lenders (Diamond 
1991). Thus particularly new and small firms are likely to be "information intensive" 
and depend on intermediated finance. 14 
10 See Calomiris and Kahn (1991). 
11  See Mayer (1988) and Hellwig (1991). 
12 See Petersen and Rajan (1994a). 
13  See ego Davis and Mayer (1991). 
14 The tendency that small firms are more dependent on intermediated finance than large firms  may 
be reinforced by the workings of securities markets, which are likely to apply higher bid-ask spreads 
to the securieties of less well-known issuers, see Bhattacharia and Thakor (1993). 
15 2.4  Supply of funds to risky undertakings can be both 
"insufficient" and "excessive" 
Adverse  selection  and  moral  hazard  typically  create  frictions  in  financial 
intermediation so that external finance to risky undertakings takes place in a lesser 
degree than would be the case in the absence of incentive problems. However, this 
need not always  be the case.  Depending on the precise incentive problem also 
excessive risk taking by the intermediaries can take place. 
One source of such excessive risk taking are misguided government policies. In 
the aftermath of the large-scale bank failures during the Great Depression in the 
United States and a number of other countries, financial markets and banking in 
particular were seen inherently unstable in the absence of government regulation.  15 
The result  was  that financial  institutions  in most industrialized countries  were 
subjected to tight regulations of different kinds. An important such regulation is 
compulsory deposit insurance. 
Starting with the analyses of Merton (1977) and Kareken and Wallace (1978), 
the side effects of deposit insurance schemes have received considerable attention 
during the last 20 years.  The basic argument is  very  simple.  Deposit insurance 
removes bank risk from the depositors eliminating all incentives of the depositors to 
monitor bank behaviour and to limit the banks' risk taking through risk-based pricing 
or rationing. Therefore, provided the premium paid by the bank for deposit insurance 
does not adequately reflect bank risk, bank value can be increased through increasing 
the riskiness of bank portfolio. The standard moral hazard problem emerges. The 
amount of equity capital is an important determinant of this moral hazard behaviour. 
If  there is only little equity to begin with, the moral hazard incentives are strong, as 
there is little for the owners to loose in the case of bad return realizations. Thus 
particularly the banks which due to earlier losses have lost most if not all of their 
equity are likely to engage in a "gamble for resurrection".16 
However, an explicit deposit insurance scheme is only one way of eliminating 
the incentives of bank creditors to limit banks' risk taking. Qualitatively the same 
results emerges if the creditors can trust that the authorities would not let a bank to 
fail  anyway,  because  of  anticipated  negative  macroeconomic  consequences. 
Particularly large banks, which have a central role in the payments systems have been 
argued to benefit from this type of"too big to fail" policies, see ego Kaufman (1992). 
15  The thought that a smooth functioning  of financial  markets  needs  intervention on  the  part of 
authorities dates back much earlier. According to Humphrey (1992), Thornton (1802) and Bagehot 
(1873) are early contributions to the discussion about the appropriateness of a lender oflast resort 
policy of a central bank. 
16  In the tightly regulated environment prevailing in most countries until the 1980s, the detrimental 
incentive effects of undepriced deposit insurance were limited by two forces. First, regulation could 
directly limit banks' portfolio choice and thus risk taking. Second, effective entry restrictions tended 
to  create "charter value" to the regulated activity holding up  bank net worth,  which discourages 
excessive risk taking. 
16 Some recent analyses have suggested that also conflicts of  interest between bank 
management and bank owners can result in excessive risk-taking by the banks.  17 They 
are based on the idea that management ability varies and is private information about 
which outsiders  can infer only from  the  return of the  portfolio chosen by the 
management. And a management of low ability makes risky short-run decisions in 
order to conceal her bad quality from outsiders. 
Gorton and Rosen (1995) consider a three period model with risk neutral bank 
managers and bank owners. The manager can keep his position in the second period 
and thus continue to earn salary only if the return on the portfolio she has chosen is 
good enough for the owners. Managers who do  not have an ability to find good 
projects to finance tend to choose too risky portfolios (relative to the situation of no 
asymmetry of information about manager ability). If most managers  are of bad 
quality, their choices determine aggregate risk taking in banking. Identifying the case 
where most bankers are of poor quality with overcapacity when banks typically 
cannot be very profitable leads to the conclusion that overcapacity may induce bank 
managements without sufficient stake in the bank to take excessive risks. Rajan 
(1994) simply assumes that the bank manager values short-term profit at the expense 
of value maxirnization, and particularly so when other firms are doing well.18  The 
main implication of  the Rajan model is that in "good times", ie. when the industry is 
on average doing well, banks whose lending has turned out to be "bad" have an 
incentive to postpone revealing the result to a period when all banks' results are bad. 
A bank can do this through further lending to the troubled customers. There is thus 
an expansionary bias in lending in good times. 
But there are many other,  more general  arguments  according to  which the 
financial intermediation may contribute to excessive risky investments. A popular 
claim is that fierce competition in the financial markets leads to excessive lending. 
This intuition has resulted in different types of  more rigorous arguments. One of  them 
is directly associated with the aforementioned moral hazard incentives of underpriced 
deposit insurance or implicit creditor protection. Stiffer competition - say due to 
lifting of  regulations or technological development - is likely to reduce the margins 
of intermediation, ie. banks' net worth. As noted above weaker bank net worth 
strengthens the latent moral hazard incentives of equity holders (and perhaps the 
management) for risk taking.19 
17 This differs from the traditional view about the potential differences in the interest of managers and 
owners, according to which manager behaviour is thought of as being too conservative relative to the 
value maximization. The reason is that managers are induced to behave in a risk-averse manner, as 
they cannot diversify their human capital which tends to be firm-specific. 
18 A reason could be that supporting the stock price (relative to other firms) through high profits helps 
the bank to  raise new capital. An alternative is that the manager believes that his future reward 
(through reputation in the labour market) depends on his relative current performance vis-a-vis other 
managers, and that good performance is valued more when also other managers are performing well 
than when they perform badly. The motivation behind the latter assumption is that if all managers 
behave badly, the results are likely to be interpreted to stem from an industry-wide shock rather than 
from the actions or ability of the manager. 
19 See Boot and Greenbaum (1993) for a theoretical analysis in which increased competition eliminates 
monopolistic rents which hinder underpriced deposit insurance from inducing strong moral hazard 
behaviour. 
17 But competition may affect loan supply behaviour in other ways as well. One 
idea is that competition may lead the banks to pay too little attention to borrower 
quality.  For example  Riordan  (1993)  argues  that  the  banks'  efforts  to  screen 
borrowers may be reduced by increased competition as the benefits from such activity--
decline with  more competition?O But it is  not at  all  clear that less information 
gathering necessarily means more risky lending. As Broecker (1990) shows, the lesser 
profitability of screening due to increased competition may in fact make lenders more 
conservative in their lending policies in fear of what is called the "winner's curse". 
Increase in the degree of banking competition may lead to higher interest rates and 
less  lending  also  due  to  interactions  with  the  imperfectly competitive  product 
markets, even though loan quality may decline, see Koskela and Stenbacka (1995). 
Some further ideas about the role of bank competition pay no explicit attention 
to credit risk but rely on changes in strategic behaviour. In particular, it has been 
argued that liberalization of financial regulation induces additional competition, as 
the banks attempt to capture market shares early on in the expanding market, see e.g. 
Vives (1991). It has been also argued that independently of any regulatory changes, 
monopolistic competition can lead to price wars in times of high demand, as the 
benefits from aggressive pricing relate to a larger-than-average overall demand while 
the retaliation of the competitors will have an effect at a later stage of more normal 
demand (Rotemberg and Saloner 1986). 
3  Financial factors and aggregate fluctuations 
The claim that the availability and cost of credit or finance in general relative to the 
safe rate of interest vary and no perfect substitute exists for bank credit suggest that 
aggregate economic behaviour may be affected by "financial factors". 
Perhaps the simplest way to analyze the aggregate effects of financial factors is 
to  introduce bank credit as  an  imperfect substitute for  bonds into  an  otherwise 
standard ISLM model (Bernanke and Blinder 1988). An obvious message is that a 
change in monetary policy (supply of  bank reserves) not only affects the safe rate of 
interest but also increases supply of bank loans and thereby aggregate demand. A 
positive shock to the loan supply function, ego due to decreased perceived riskiness 
of lending, leads to a lower loan rate and higher output and (with higher transaction 
demand for money) to a higher safe rate of  interest. The difference between the risky 
lending rate and the safe bond rate thus declines. A negative shock works in the 
opposite direction, say, a decline in bank capital leading to reduced supply of loans, 
smaller output and higher spread between the lending rate and the safe rate.21 
However, embedding imperfectly substitutable bank credit into a macro model 
is  not very satisfactory, as  one does  not really know how the assumed financial 
market friction interacts with macrovariables. Several theoretical models have been 
20 See also Kanniainen and Stenbacka (1996). 
21  A  more comprehensive financial  system than that just consisting of money had been analyzed 
already earlier particularly by Tobin, see ego Brainard and Tobin (1963) and Tobin (1969). However, 
these models were not based on any well-established theory about the role of  financial intermediation. 
18 constructed to bridge the gap. One such analysis of the aggregate effects of borrower 
net worth is provided by Bernanke and Gertler (1989). 
The  analysis  demonstrates  the  effects  of costly  state  verification  in  an 
overlapping generations model with two types of agents, entrepreneurs and lenders. 
In the absence of informational asymmetry ie. verification costs, cost of capital and 
investment are constant in the face of  productivity shocks. Production varies with the 
serially uncorrelated shocks, while consumption is smoothed over time and thus 
displays serial correlation. Introducing positive verification cost makes cost of capital 
positively  related  to  borrower  net  worth.  Current  investment  and  through  the 
increased capital  stock future  investment  respond  then  to  productivity  shocks. 
Serially uncorrelated shocks are propagated through a "financial accelerator" into 
cyclical  fluctuation  not  present  without  the  friction  in  the  capital  market. 
Furthermore, a redistribution of wealth from borrowers to lenders in one period leads 
to lower investment for several periods. Thus for instance an unexpected decline in 
inflation can disturb the real debt burdens and lead to a persistent decline in output. 
Many other models with different information problems produce analogous 
results of net worth propagating the effects of shocks. Bernanke and Gertler (1990) 
analyze in a static framework the perhaps quantitatively more significant problem of 
lenders not knowing the borrowers' types, actions and project qualities. Greenwald 
and Stiglitz (1993) consider a set-up where firms cannot diverfify risk and therefore 
act in a risk-averse manner. Equity issue is constrained by information problems. 
Random price shocks move equity and through that working capital and production, 
which will not return the pre-shock level before net worth has recovered. In Kiyotaki 
and Moore (1995) the price of an asset which is used both as input in production and 
as collateral for lending is the key factor through which shocks to productivity and 
net  worth  distribution  propagate  over  time  and  sectors  leading  to  persistent 
fluctuations in output and asset prices. 
Lamont (1995) presents a stylized general equilibrium model in which "debt-
overhang"  ie.  existing  debt  prevents  firms  from  financing  as  such  profitable 
investments (net present value positive) if expectations are "pessimistic" but sets no 
such constraints if expectations are "optimistic". The model can result in multiple 
equilibria because of strategic complementarities: if a firm expects other firms to 
increase investment, it finds optimal to invest more too. Existing debt, which has to 
be serviced first, may prevent firms from undertaking as such profitable investments. 
Due to the interdependence of investments of different firms these debt problems 
spill over into the behaviour of other firms. Lamont points out that the debt overhang 
is likely to result in low-activity equilibrium particularly in the aftermath of a period 
of optimistic expectations during which leverage becomes high,  as  low-activity 
equilibria are considered unlikely. This implication resembles very much what Fisher 
(1933) wrote about the "havoc" caused by "overintebtedness" followed by deflation. 
Intermediaries  have  been  incorporated  explicitely  in  several  analyses. 
Williamson (1987) constructs a model, where (large) financial intermediaries emerge 
endogenously to economize monitoring costs. Credit is rationed and the amount of 
rationing varies over business cycle in response to changes in the default probabilities 
of the borrowers. Output displays cyclical variation and is negatively related to risk 
preemia, much as in Bernanke and Gertler (1989). Variation in intermediary credit 
and liabilities lead output variation. The intermediaries' ability to attract deposits 
from ultimate investors is based on perfect diversification of the idiosycratic risks of 
lending through large (in fact infinite) size. However, the sort of banks suggested by 
19 the analysis do not resemble too much observed intermediaries, which typically use 
non-negligible amount of capital as a buffer between asset returns and the contractual 
commitments vis-a.-vis their creditors. 
An early analysis of  the role of  intermediary capital is provided by Bemanke and 
Gertler (1987). They focus solely on intermediated credit on the premise that owing 
to technological advantages in project evalution and monitoring only bank credit is 
available to risky investments. The basic message is that both borrower net worth 
(value of collateralizable assets)  and intermediary capital are  essential for risky 
investments to  find financing.  A  collapse of either would be sufficient to  shift 
financing from risky projects to safe assets. 
Intermediary capital plays an important role also in the analysis of Tirole and 
Holmstrom (1994). In their model both direct finance from the ultimate investors and 
intermediated finance can be used to realize investments for which the entrepreneur's 
own funds are not sufficient. External finance is limited by borrower capital, because 
only by investing own capital in the risky project the entrepreneur can credibly 
commit herself to not shirking ie. choosing an inferior project that gives private 
benefit. Monitoring by an intermediary (only intermediaries assumed to have the 
capacity) may eliminate the most inferior projects. But the intermediary also has an 
incentive problem vis-a.-vis the investors, and to overcome that it needs to invest 
some  of its  own  capital  in  the  project.  Intermediation  is  thus  constrained  by 
intermediary capital. 
The model predicts that high net worth firms rely on direct finance, which is 
cheaper than the intermediated finance  due to  monitoring costs, firms  with less 
capital resort to intermediated finance and low capital firms may be forced to skip 
investment.  Negative shocks  to  firm capital ("collateral squeeze"), bank capital 
("credit crunch") and savings ("savings squeeze") all reduce investment, and the first 
to do so are low net worth firms. The effects on interest rates differ however. Credit 
crunch increases the rate firms pay for intermediated credit while it decreases the rate 
paid to the investors. Collateral squeese decreases both. 
Although the recent models on the role financial intermediation in aggregate 
economic fluctuations differ in many respects from one another, they share several 
common features. First, they suggest that many types of shocks not only spread but 
get  magnified  - propagate  - through  the  financial  system,  where  frictions  of 
intermediation increase in response to chocks. There is a "financial accelerator". 
Importantly, a small one-time shock may lead to long-lasting variation in output and 
prices. 
Second, given that financial intermediaries are seen as an efficient arrangement 
to alleviate the inherent intermediation frictions, any shocks to the intermediaries' 
capacity or incentives to channel funds affect the scale and efficiency of external 
finance as a whole. Direct finance from ultimate savers to the users of funds is not a 
perfect substitute for intermediary finance. In a sense, financial intermediation may 
be disturbed at two places: (1) borrowers' credit quality may be affected by their 
balance sheets, and (2)  intermediaries' credit supply may be affected by various 
shocks. Monetary policy may affect real outcomes through both mechanisms, which 
combined constitute "a credit channel" as opposed to the money channel embodied 
in the ISLM framework. 
Third, changes in the attractiveness of safe and risky financial instruments play 
a central role in all these theories. They predict in particular that when the frictions 
in intermediation are high, there is substitution from risky "information intensive" 
20 assets into safe ones, "flight to quality", which is reflected in the relative prices ie. the 
yield spreads between risky and safe assets increase. Furthermore, in the financial 
intermediation story these spreads should be associated with observed spending 
decisions in contrast to conventional neoclassical models, see Gertler, Hubbard, and 
Kashyap (1991). 
Fourth, the propagation mechanism is likely to be non-linear. As the frictions in 
financial  intermediation  are  greatest  with  low  borrower  net  worth  and  high 
uncertainty, the effects of any shocks are particularly strong in economic recessions, 
characterized by low cash flows, low asset values and high uncertainty. Therefore 
these mechanisms would seem to be more capable of  rationalizing changes in activity 
in deep downturns and recessions than when activity and asset values are high and 
still growing. 
Fifth, the theories based on information and incentive problems of financial 
intermediation suggest a specific type of definition for  financial crises (Mishkin 
1994): "A financial  crisis is  a disruption to  financial  markets in  which adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems become much worse, so that financial markets 
are  unable to  efficiently channel funds  to  those who  have  the most productive 
investment opportunities". This is in contrast with many traditional views of  financial 
crises, which either emphasize the role of banking panics reducing money supply 
(Friedman  and  Schwarz)  or  the  role  of unexplained  changes  in  expectations 
(Kindleberger, Minsky). 
Sixth, the theories are "real" rather than monetary explanations of economic 
cycles.  Monetary shocks mayor may not affect the economy, depending on  the 
model. However, one if  not the only way they affect real outcomes is through changes 
in the supply of risky credit or finance in general. A "credit channel" of monetary 
policy is suggested, provided monetary policy at all can affect real outcomes. 
Finally, although most of the reviewed theories about the role of balance sheet 
structures and financial intermediation rationalize why intermediation and economic 
activity may be smaller than what would obtain in an undistorted Modigliani-Miller 
world, "excessive" risky undertakings are not excluded either. 
4  Empirical evidence 
Even  though  the  case  can  be  made  on  theoretical  grounds  that  financial 
intermediation is plagued with distortions that matter for real outcomes, whether they 
indeed  matter  is  an  empirical  question.  Both  the  significance  of the  potential 
distortions  and  their  variation  over  time  depend  on  a  host  of factors  whose 
importance is difficult to assess a priori. Therefore a vast empirical literature has 
emerged to explore the importance of financial intermediation in various historical 
episodes. 
One set of studies have focused directly the on intermediation process trying 
establish whether the observed patterns of financial stocks or flows and financial 
prices are inconsistent with the standard Modigliani-Miller type of assumptions but 
consistent with some alternative hypothesis. Another approach is to examine whether 
the behaviour of real quantities such as  production, sales, purchases of goods or 
employment  displays  patterns  which  would  be  insonsistent  with  the  standard 
assumptions but consistent with some hyporthesis about the role of financial factors. 
21 Both types of analyses have been conducted with both aggregate and disaggregate 
micro data, although the latter have been more typical reflecting the nature of the 
potential financial distortions. 
In this section the main empirical findings are briefly summarized. Evidence 
concerning Finland is not touched upon at this point, it will be discussed in the next 
section. 
4.1  Functioning of the financial system as such 
Direct tests of credit rationing 
One set of questions concerns the nature of equilibrium in the financial markets. As 
noted above,  some theories based on  asymmetric information suggest that price 
mechanism  may  not  equilibriate  demand  and  supply  for  credit,  but  there  is 
quantitative rationing in the sense that at least for some borrowers increasing the 
price of credit does not result in increased supply of funds. However, attempts to test 
directly credit rationing have given rather mixed results. A key prediction of the 
theories of credit rationing is that the prices charged for loans do not vary as much 
the safe rates of  interest of similar maturity. Although some studies have found that 
bank loan  rates  have  indeed been "sticky",  the  evidence  cannot necessarily be 
interpreted as supporting credit rationing. The observed stickiness may relate more 
to long-term credit relationships than rationing, as the stickiness has been found to 
concerns also loans made under loan commitments ie.  customers who should be 
protected from rationing?2 Nevertheless, given the multidimensional nature of loan 
contracts, identifying the price for credit as the rate of interest may be misleading, 
calling into question the usefulness of direct tests of this sort. 
hnperfect substitutability of bank lending 
Another  line  of research  is  to  examine  the  uniqueness  of bank or in  general 
intermediary lending ie.  whether there  is  evidence that access  to  bank loans  is 
valuable so that it cannot be costlessly substituted for with external finance from 
other sources.  On balance, the evidence seems  to  support the idea of imperfect 
substitutability. For example, Fama(1985) documents that the interest rates paid by 
American  banks  for  money  market  funding  (CD's)  have  been  very  close  to 
commercial paper rates, despite the fact that only CD's have been subject to a costly 
reserve requirement. Fama concludes that bank borrowers must bear the cost of 
reserve requirement, and their willingness to  do  so  suggests that bank loans are 
valued over other finance. 
Similarily,  James  (1987)  finds  that  in  a  sample  of 300  American  firms 
announcements of new bank credits resulted in significant positive abnormal returns 
on firm equity while corresponding announcements of bond issues were followed 
either by no significant return response (public debt) or by a significant negative 
22  See Berger and Udell (1992). 
22 response (private placement). Some later studies have found similar evidence with 
different data sets.23 
A rather different approach to the imperfect substitutability issue is to examine 
the mix of borrowing by the non-financial sector. Thus Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox 
(1993) find that the aggregate level ratio of  bank loans to commercial paper declined 
after tightening of monetary policy in the United States in the period of the mid-
1960s through 1989. They interpret this to suggest that bank loans and commercial 
papers are imperfect substitutes and that monetary policy works through a bank credit 
channel.  24 
Tiering as an indicator of financial distress 
A  key prediction of the model of financial  intermediation based on asymmetric 
information is that in "bad times" the yield premium of high risk assets over that of 
safe assets inreases relative to "good times ", ie. "tiering" takes place. The widening 
spread is thus a signal of increased frictions of financial intermediation, and should 
constrain spending.  One should observe tiering particularly at times when other 
indicators suggest that intermediation is seriously disturbed, for example around 
panking panics. There is some evidence both of  the influence of tiering on investment 
spending and of its signaling of panking panics. 
Gertier, Hubbard and Kashyap (1991) find that inclusion of the spread between 
6  months  commercial paper rate and  corresponding treasury bill  rate  improves 
significantly the fit of an Euler-equation for US investment spending in 1964-1989. 
However, it might be misleading to interpret the spread between the short-term rates 
as signaling in default premium, as commercial papers are typically issued by only 
very low-risk firms.  As suggested by Bernanke (1990), such a spread may reflect 
more the stance of monetary policy. 
On the other hand, Mishkin (1991) documents that an increase in the spread of 
high yielding corporate bonds over that of safer instruments (goverment bonds or the 
lowest yielding corporate bonds, depending on time period) preceded the banking 
panics in the United States prior to Second World War in 7 of the 8 cases. Based on 
this observation about timing, Mishkin concludes that the panics did not cause the 
changes  in  spread but were  a  reflection  of the  same  fundamental  increases  of 
uncertainty that caused the spreads to increase. Also in two post-war occasions, in 
23 See Slovin, 10hnson and Glascock (1992) who document with a different data set that the positive 
return responses to loan announcements concern small firms but not large firms .A case study of the 
effects of the de facto failure in 1984 of a large bank, Continental Illinois and its subsequent rescue 
by the authorities shows that listed firms having a loan relationship with the bank displayed -4.2 per 
cent excess return on average in the failure stage, and 2.0 excess return on average in response to the 
announcement of the rescue plan (Slovin, Sushka and Polonchek,  1993). This can interpreted as 
reflecting the value of the credit relationship for even large firms. 
24  Also in the period  1989-1992 the CP share inreased substantially as  commercial paper stock 
increased and bank lending contracted (Calomiris, Himmelberg and WachteI1994). Only highly rated 
firms issue commercial paper, and the change in the mix does not reflect firm level substitution but that 
firms dependent on bank loans are squeezed by the banks. Firms issuing commercial paper may 
alleviate this problem by extending trade credit financed by CD's. Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) report 
evidence, consistent with the above findings, that the share of small firms in bank business lending 
decreases after monetary tightening. 
23 conjunction with the Penn Central bankruptcy in 1970 and the stock market crash of 
1987, increases of spreads are visible. They remained small, however, presumably 
owing to the substantial interventions of the central bank to guarantee the liquidity 
of the important market participants. 
Mishkin's conclusions about banking panics not being a primary cause but rather 
a reflection of  financial distress is supported by the analysis of  Gorton (1988). Gorton 
finds that the American banking panics prior to deposit insurance were triggered by 
large shocks (insolvencies of non-financial corporations) in the aftermath of business 
cycle peaks. 
Credit or capital crunch in the early 1990s 
As was discussed above, bank capital limits banks' borrowing and as a consequence 
credit supply in many theories of adverse selection and moral hazard. In addition 
capital regulation may limit banks' possibilities to expand lending. The slowdown 
and even contraction of  bank lending in many counties, particularly the United States 
in the early  1990 has provided fresh  data for  examining these  hypoteses.  This 
phenomenon, usually called credit crunch but also capital crunch has become the 
subject of a large number of studies, almost exclusively on American data. 
The American literature, which has recently been surveyd by Passmore and 
Sharpe (1994) and Sharpe (1995), has given rather mixed results. Several studies 
examining the time paths of lending, interest rates, economic activity etc. conclude 
that bank lending indeed contracted in the early 1990s more than demand conditions 
and the stance of monetary policy would have warranted, see Akhtar (1994), Lown 
and Wenninger (1994). But most credit crunch studies have used data on individual 
intermediaries or some narrower aggregates of them (eg. different states of the U.S.). 
Many of these studies have discovered bank capital as  an important constraining 
factor, ie. that the issue indeed is "capital crunch" (eg. Bernanke and Lown 1991). 
Some studies have furthermore implicated capital regulation or rather its tightening 
through higher requirements or through stiffer enforcement as the reason for capital 
insufficiency (eg. Peek and Rosengren 1995a). However, the results tend to depend 
a great deal on how extensively the analyses control for other factors: the more care 
is taken of  ego borrower quality, monetary policy conditions etc. the less important 
bank capital turns out to be in the regressions, see Berger and Udell (1994). 
Studies with European data are few, and they do not go a long way to control for 
other factors than the hypothesized effects.25 
Excessive risk taking 
The argument that underpriced deposit insurance leads to excessive risk-taking has 
been  often  cited  in the context of bank failures.  Particularly the  behaviour of 
25  The only studies directly examining the potential roIe of banks' changed supply behaviour with 
European data seem to be O'Brian and Browne (1992) partially on European countries, L1evellyn and 
Drake (1994) on the UK, and SoIttila dn Vihriiilii (1992) and Saarenheimo (1995) on Finland. While 
all of them find some support for the existence of a credit crunch, the evidence is rather weak. The 
analyses of Solttila and Vihriiilii and Saarenheimo will be discussed somewhat more in section 5. 
24 American thrift institutions in the early 1980s is a frequently-used example of such 
moral hazard in action, see ego White (1991). But systematic empirical studies of the 
hypothesis are few, and the results vary a great deal. 
Perhaps the most relevant analysis is provided by Keeley (1990). He examined 
150 largest American bank holding companies in the period of 1970 through 1986. 
He found evidence that low underlying profitability or rather a low "charter value" 
of a bank as measured by the ratio of the market value to the book value of bank 
assets had a positive impact on risk taking by the banks. Risk taking was measured 
by the ratio of the market value of equity to the market value of assets (the higher the 
ratio, the smaller the default risk) and by the CD rates (the higher the rates, the higher 
the default risk).  Keeley argues  that the driving force behind moral hazard was 
increased competition in the market for banking services, which lowered banks' 
charter value. Underpriced deposit insurance facilitated the risk taking but was not 
a problem as long as the owners' equity stake remained high due to the priviledged 
position of banking. 
But using a different methodology and examining some 1800 FDIC-insured 
commercial banks in the years 1983 through 1987 Shrieves and Dahl (1992) provide 
evidence of a positive relationship between bank capital and bank risk, which is in 
conflict with the moral hazard hypothesis. In their study risk is measured either by the 
share of non-performing assets or by the ratio of  risk-weighted assets (as defined for 
the purposes of capital regulation)  over total assets.  An important aspect is that 
Shrieves and Dahl allow capital to be endogenous in the long run. Corroborating 
evidence is also provided by Randall (1993) and Furlong (1988). 
In the aforementioned studies all the banks investigated are insured so  that 
identifying the specific effect of deposit insurance very difficult. To overcome this 
problem Wheelock (1992) analyzes 257 insured and uninsured Kansas banks of the 
1920s. He finds that the banks whose deposits were insured chose riskier portolios 
and failed with a higher probability than the uninsured banks. Park (1994) examines 
data on basically all the FDIC insured banks for the years 1984 through 1988. He 
finds negative bivariate relationships between lending growth and other measures of 
risk taking on the one hand and capital asset ratios and earnings on assets on the other 
hand. 
No studies seem to exist on the effects of deposit insurance or more generally 
implicit creditor protection on banks' risk taking using European data. 
There have also been some attempts to examine the more general hypothesis 
advocated by Minsky and Kindleberger that banks' credit expansion tends to become 
"excessive" in times of "optimism" leading to excessive risk-taking and in the end 
to  bank failures.  Kindleberger  himself provides  evidence  of such  episodes  by 
invetigating  37  financial  crises  between  1720  and  1976.  Several  authors  have, 
however, critisized Kindleberger's evidence strongly on the grounds that he does not 
define a financial crisis properly and does not in particular take into account the role 
of money supply.26 
26 Schwarz (1986) argues that Kindleberger does not distinguish between "real" and "pseudo" financial 
crises, where a real financial crisis means a situation involving extreme demand for high-powered 
money. More generally the claims of Minsky and Kindleberger are critisized ego  by  Benston and 
Kaufman (1995). 
25 4.2  Financial factors and real variables 
A large number of studies have examined directly the existence of a link between 
financial factors and real quantities (output, investment, employment, sales). Studies 
with aggregate data have produced rather mixed results. In contrast, analyses using 
micro data rather consistently suggest that real  decisions indeed are  affected by 
financial factors. Their overall importance remains unclear, however. 
As the American Great Depression is one of the main impetuses for academic 
interest in the potential role  of financial  intermediation  in  aggregate  economic 
behaviour, many studies have focused this period.  In an influencial contribution 
Bemanke (1983) argued that increased frictions in financial intermediation caused by 
both a reduction of borrowers' net worth and failures  of intermediaries reduced 
production, even when monetary factors are controlled for.  Bemanke's empirical 
analysis consists effectively of adding (lags  of)  the  deposits of failed banks and 
liabilities of failed businesses or a spread between corpare bonds and goverment 
bonds  in  a  Lucas-Barro  type  of monetary  supply  equation,  where  (lags  of) 
unanticipated changes in money or price level are used to explain output variation. 
The estimated effects of the financial factors, while not diminishing the significance 
of the money or price variables, were clearly significant for the estimation period 
111921-1211941. Furthermore, when simulated over the worst depression period, the 
inclusion of the financial factors reduced the mean squared error by 50 per cent. 
However, Bemanke's findings do not seem to generalize to Canada, which did not 
experience any banking panics, suggesting that other disturbances of intermediation 
than those  associated directly with the creation of bank money may have been 
quantitatively rather insignificant in North America in the 1930s.27 
Many  studies  have  investigated  the  relative  merits  of credit  aggregates  as 
opposed  to  monetary  aggregates  in  forecasting  various  aggregate  demand  and 
production variables in the post-war period. The conclusions have varied a great deal 
depending on the exact formulation and data set.28 This is true both for bank credit 
and for wider credit aggregates.  Given the  accounting connection between bank 
loans, which are a major component of overall borrowing by the private sector in 
most countries, and bank deposits, which constitute the main part of the typically 
used money concepts, the inconclusiveness of these aggregate time series analyses 
is not surprising. 
Following Bemanke (1983), some recent studies have also tried to incorporate 
the condition of  the banking sector into the analysis of aggregate time series. Samolyk 
(1994) examines whether personal income growth depends on lagged income and a 
number of variables reflecting the "health" of banks' balance sheets. The data are US 
state level aggregates for 1983 through 1990. She splits the observations on the one 
hand according to whether the share of non-performing loans is higher or lower than 
the national average in a given year and on the other hand whether the income growth 
is higher or lower than the national average. Samolyk finds that allowing parameters 
27 Haubrich (1990) finds that in Canada the financial factors played no role, and interprets this to imply 
that without banking panics, which did not emerge in Canada, the role of financial intermediaries was 
not important. However, in a survey on the role of financial factors in Great Depression, Calomiris 
(1993) contests Haubrich's interpretation. 
28 See, King (1986), Bernanke (1986), Friedman and Kuttner (1993) and Ramey (1993). 
26 to differ across the subsamples of  different banking conditions improves significantly 
the fit of the model while such a difference across the two income growth gategories 
is  inconsequential.  The  results  are  thus  consistent  with  the  idea that  banking 
condititions  matter for  real  outcomes.  However,  some  studies  report  quite  the 
opposite results.29 
The highly mixed results of the aggregate analyses have induced a great interest 
in using micro level - cross-section or panel - data to examine the dependence of 
real decisions on financial factors. 
For example, Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) investigate the dependence 
of investment on cash flow with data on listed American companies. They separate 
divident paying companies and those who do not pay divident. The latter ones are 
assumed on a priori grounds to be more likely to be have higher costs of funding (or 
be  rationed)  than  the  former  ones.  Controlling  for  the  nature  of investment 
opportunities with a Tobin-Q variable, they find that cash-flow variables affect 
strongly investment of  the a priori financially constrained firms but only little that of 
the  divident paying firms.  Similar results  have been found  with data on  other 
countries as well.30 
A somewhat different approach is to examine Euler equations with and without 
a debt constraint. Whited (1992) does so with a sample of large American firms 
which he splits according to whether the firm has a bond rating or not. The firms with 
bond rating are assumed to be financially stronger ie. face less borrowing constraints. 
The unconstrained equation is rejected both for pooled data and the group of no bond 
listing while it cannot be rejected for the group consisting of rated firms.3! 
Also inventory investment has been found to depend on financial conditions. 
Kashyap et. al (1994) document a firm level positive relationship between inventory 
investment and liquid assets with US data from the 1980s. The effect is pronounced 
in recession periods. However, such relationships are not necessarily universal. Vale 
(1995) estimates the same type of model for a cross-section of 881 Norwegian firms 
in 1992. In this case liquid assets are of no significance. Furthermore, inventory 
investment does not depend on whether the firm had a banking relationship with what 
Vale designates problem banks. 
Most of the micro data studies on the effect of liquidity constraints on consumer 
demand support the hypothesis of imperfectly functioning financial intermediation. 
The  studies  typically  find  excess  sensitity  of demand  to  current  income  for 
households that are a priori classified as potentially credit-constrained, see ego Zeldes 
(1989). The role of household balance sheets has been emphasized particularly in the 
context of deep recessions. Mishkin (1978) argues that the liquidity constraints felt 
29 Guenther et al. (1995) for example find no effect of banking conditions on real variables in a V  AR 
analysis with data on the State of Texas for 1976Ql through 1990Q4. The real stock of all bank loans, 
commercial loans, book value of equity capital, or the loan to asset ratio or equity to asset ratio have 
no influence on real industrial production, employment or real income, while there are relative strong 
reverse effects. 
30 Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991) examine the dependence of investment on cash flow with 
data on Japanese firms.  The so-called keirestsu firms,  which  are supposed to be less financially 
constrained, display less sensitivity of investment to cash flow than other firms. 
31  Studies with European data have yielded similar result, see Bond and Meghir (1994) on UK data and 
Estrada and Va1l6s (1995) on Spanish data. 
27 by households due to weakening of their balance sheets were significant in reducing 
overall demand in the course of the American Great Depression through the effects 
on expenditure on durables and housing. King (1994) applies the same argument to 
the UK recession in the early 1990s. 
4.3  Overall conclusion on evidence 
On a whole there is subtantial evidence that financial intermediation is plagued by 
frictions which raise the cost of external finance to many firms  and households 
relative to what it would be in "perfect capital markets" and that the extra cost varies 
over time. Furthemore, banks appear to be a valuable source of external finance to 
many firms and households, so that variation in their loan supply affect the overall 
supply of external finance to the private sector. 
ID addition, the frictions seem to be significant enough to affect real decisions. 
Investment is affected not only by the profitability of investment projects and "the 
rate of interest", but also by the cost of external funds  on top of that rate and/or 
quantitative constraints. A similar conclusion holds for consumption. 
However,  the exact mechanisms  through which the financial  factors  affect 
behaviour are not clear. Thus the role of quantitative constraints as opposed to price 
premia is ambiguous. Similarly, although there is evidence about the importance of 
both the borrower balance sheets and intermediary behaviour, their relative merits are 
difficult to disentangle. More important, the quantitative significance of financial 
factors relative to  other factors in explaining the observed patterns of aggregate 
economic fluctuations seems uncertain. 
On  balance,  it  seems  plausible  that  financial  factors  have  contributed 
significantly to deep recessions (particularly the Great Depression in the 1930s) and 
retarded recovery from some resession (eg. the 1990-1991 recession in the United 
States). But whether the "financial accelerator"  is  more  generally an important 
element of aggregate economic fluctuations seems an open question. ID particular, no 
solid evidence exists to support the hypothesis that "excessive" risky lending by 
banks and other financial intermediaries has contributed to economic booms. The 
leading testable hypothesis  is  that moral hazard created by underpriced deposit 
insurance or "too big to fail" policies of the regulatory authorities leads to excessive 
risk taking by banks. But evidence on this hypothesis is very mixed. Finally, a vast 
majority of the empirical analyses of the role of financial factors has been conducted 
with American data. As many institutional arrangement differ a great deal between 
different countries, these studies do not necessarily tell much about the situation in 
Europe. 
28 5  The Finnish boom-bust cycle in the light of 
financial intermediation theories 
5.1  Background: the financial system and deregulation 
As in several other countries having experienced a strong debt-financed economic 
boom followed by a deep recession with stagnating or declining credit stocks after 
the mid-1980s,  also  in  Finland the  backdrop of the  credit cycle  was  financial 
liberalization. 
Until the early 1980s, the Finnish financial markets were in several important 
respects regulated. First, capital import and export were tightly controlled by the 
central  bank.  Most  borrowing  and  lending  across  the  border  was  subject  to 
quantitative restrictions.  Second, interest rates on bank loans  and deposits were 
regulated at low levels, either directly by the central bank or indirectly by tying tax 
exemption on interest earnings to a given uniform deposit interest rate. As inflation 
often was high relative to the regulated lending rates and even households could 
deduct from taxable income interest expenses on loans up to a relatively high ceiling, 
regulation resulted in excess demand for credit probably for long periods of time. 
Regulation induced therefore credit rationing quite independently of any potential 
"equilibrium credit rationing". 
Unlike in some other countries, banks were not required to invest in government 
paper. Instead, bank intermediation was heavily subsidized through tax exemption 
of deposit interest earnings. The securities market remained small and for the most 
part illiquid. In part this was the result of low government indebtedness: there was no 
need for large quantities of government paper which would have formed a solid 
foundation for the securities market. In part the insignificance of the securities market 
reflected the subsidization of bank intermediation. 
The result was a highly bank-centered financial system, in which even large 
corporates relied on banks as the main source of not only short-term but also longer-
term external finance. This tendency was further strengthened by the fact that banks 
were often times significant owners in major corporations, which was allowed by the 
banking legislation based on the idea of universal banks. The predominance of  banks 
implied that any changes in banks' credit supply would very likely affect significantly 
also the overall supply of credit to the non-financial sector.32 
Bank legislation in force in the mid-1980s distinguished between four types of 
banks: commercial banks, savings banks, cooperative banks, and the government-
owned post-office bank (Postipankki or PSP)33.  In practice, the types of business 
allowed for the different banking institutions did not differ a great deal. Thus, all 
banks could ie.  issue deposit liabilities,  lend to  non-financial  corporations  and 
32 Also the insurance companies accumulating pension contributions have been significant lenders to 
the private sector. However, about half of their lending has been guaranteed by deposit banks. Thus, 
in terms of credit risk, the deposit banks have accounted for approximately 2/3 of the private sector's 
borrowing even in the recent years. 
33 As of  the beginning of 1988, the legislation of the post-office bank has been essentially harmonized 
with that of commercial banks, so that it can for all practical purposes be considered a commercial 
bank. 
29 households, provide payments facilities, trustee services, and guarantees as well as 
conduct securities transactions. In lending, the savings banks and the cooperative 
banks were restricted to lend only "against a safe security", but what would constitute 
such a  security  was  not  precisely  defined.  Another restriction  on  the  business 
opportunities of these banks was that unlike the commercial banks, the local banks 
were not in general allowed to conduct in their own name transactions in foreign 
currency. In the  1980s the cooperative and savings banks neither had any direct 
borrowing facilities with the Bank of Finland nor were their certificates of deposit 
accepted as material for the central bank money market operations. 
In terms of market behaviour it was typical to distinguish between five different 
banks or banking groups: two major commercial banks, KOP and SYP (Unitas), the 
Post-office bank, the savings bank group and the cooperative bank group. In the mid-
1980s,  the  savings  bank  group  consisted  of some  250  savings  banks  and  a 
commercial bank owned by the savings banks, Skopbank. Similarily, the cooperative 
bank group consisted of over 360 cooperative banks and a commercial bank owned 
by the cooperative banks,  Okobank.  Skopbank and Okobank conducted for the 
savings  and  cooperative  banks,  respectively,  many  transactions  which  were 
prohibited for these banks themselves, ego borrowing from the Bank of Finland and 
from abroad. Thus the overall number of banks was very large, but in many respect 
there were only five major players in the market place. Although legislation did not 
imply  any  strict  segmentation  of the  banking  market,  the  commercial  banks 
specialized in lending and provision of other banking services to the corporate sector, 
while the savings banks and cooperative banks provided banking services mainly to 
the households and small enterprises. 
An implication of regulation also was that the banks were induced to compete 
with quality of services and in particular with the density of branch networks. The 
result was high costs of operation, and - by international comparison - relatively 
weak profitability.34 This implied that some banks had considerable difficulties in 
meeting the capital adequacy requirements, even though they were not particularly 
demanding before the introduction of new regulations in the 1990s.35 Although the 
regulatory  capital  requirements  were  more  lenient  for  the  savings  banks  and 
cooperative banks than for other banks, the capital adequacy problems were more 
serious for these types of banks. Given their legal nature as foundation-like entities 
(the savings banks) and cooperatives (the cooperative banks) they could not augment 
capital through issues of equity. Instead they would have to rely on retained earnings, 
which particularly for the savings banks typically were  smaller than the  as  such 
meager average of the Finnish banks. 
Deposits of all types of banks were covered by a 100 per cent deposit insurance, 
provided by the respective "security funds" of the commercial banks, the savings 
banks and the cooparative banks. Membership in a security fund was mandatory, and 
the  insurance  premium  was  flat  rate,  and  in  general  very  small  so  that  the 
accumulated funds remained small. 
In the early 1980s, the tight regulation of the financial markets started to become 
increasingly difficult, as financial innovation progressively created new opportunities 
34  See ego Vesala (1995a) for an international comparison. 
35 The capital requirement was 4 per cent of bank liabilities for the commercial banks and 2 per cent 
of bank liabilities for the savings banks and the cooperative banks. 
30 for  circumvention.  Simultaneously,  as  in  other countries,  the doubts  about  the 
instability of an unregulated financial system gave way to the view that regulation 
was causing substantial losses in terms of  both operational and allocative efficiency. 
A process of gradual deregulation started. In 1980, constraints on banks' short-:,term 
borrowing in foreign . currency were  substantially reduced.  From  1982  onwards 
regulation of average lending rates was gradually eased by allowing the banks to pass 
through to lending rates a part of  the extra costs of  purchased funds over the regulated 
deposit rates. In August 1986 the remaining regulations on the average lending rates 
were lifted. Restictions on capital import were also gradually eased through more 
liberal licencing practices and through exemptions of certain classes of borrowers 
from constraints altogether. As  of August 1987 long-term foreign borrowing was 
fully  freed  for  the  corporate  sector,  with  the  exception  of sales  of markka 
denominated bonds abroad at issue. This last constraint was abolished in early 1990. 
Simultaneously,  also restrictions  on capital export were lifted. For firms,  direct 
investments and portfolio investments abroad were freed in 1989, for households in 
1990. The remnants of capital controls were abolished in October 1990 with the 
freeing  of households  foreign  borrowing.  In  1991,  several  larger  savings  and 
cooparative banks were authorized to conduct most operations in foreign currency 
including borrowing from from abroad in their own name. 
Thus towards the end of 1987 capital import and price setting on bank lending 
had been liberalized in an important way, while tax rules continued to favour bank 
deposits and borrowing in general. Prudential regulation and supervision of banks 
and  other  financial  intermediaries  remained  effectively  unchanged,  although 
preparations to tighten capital regulations began in the mid-1980s. By mid-1988 it 
had become clear that capital regulations would be tightened significantly along the 
lines suggested by the Bank for International Settlements. The new regulations came 
into force in fact in the beginning of 1991. Finally, as of the beginning of 1994, the 
capital regulations were fully harmonized with the ED regulation which correspond 
to  the  BIS  recommendations.  This  last change  implied  a  tightening  of capital 
regulation for the cooperative and savings banks by several percentage points.36 
Liberalization of  lending rates and the simultaneous changes in the central bank's 
operating procedures contributed to an emergence of a true money market. On the one 
hand, banks could now pass through to the borrowers the cost of money market 
funds. On the other hand, as the central bank chose its own certificates of deposits 
(CD's)  and those of the banks to be the instrument of market operations in early 
1987, bank CD's became liquid instruments. The CD market provided a basis for a 
rapid development of  markets for other instruments such as forward contracts. On the 
whole, the money market allowed the banks much more freedom in choosing the 
speed of credit extension,  as  they  were  not  anymore  as  dependent  on  deposit 
financing as before. The change was particularly significant for the savings banks and 
cooperative banks, which had previously been able to finance lending in excess to 
deposits only by borrowing from their "central banks", Skopbank and Okobank. For 
some larger savings and cooperative banks, the conditions in the CD market became 
36 The main difference in the 1991 capital regulations and the 1994 regulations is that according to the 
former regulations loans insured by an insurance company were classified in the 50 % risk category 
instead of the 100 % category. This had practical importance for the cooperative and the savings 
banks, as these banks had established mutual credit insurance companies to even out risks among the 
member institutions. 
31 close to  those of commercial banks in  1991, as  several banks'  CD's were then 
accepted as material for the Bank of Finland money market operations. 
Lifting of direct regulations was accompanied by tax reforms seeking to reduce 
tax privileges of  different kinds, lower the high marginal taxes on labour incomes and 
streamline the tax system in general. For the functioning of the financial markets, the 
most important measures concerned taxation of capital income and the treatment of 
interest expenses. The first step was taken in January 1989, as the scope for tax 
exemption of deposit interests was somewhat reduced, and capital gains taxation was 
tightened.  These changes implied a slight increase in the average costs of bank 
deposits, and a flurry of  enterprise sales towards the end of 1988 before the tightening 
of capital gains taxation would take effect. The introduction of a source tax for 
deposit (excluding the still-allowed tax exempt accounts) and bond income in the 
beginning of 1991 facilitated a true competion on deposit rates contributing to higher 
funding costs for the banks. Deductibility of interest expenses in personal taxation 
was reduced in several steps, but a major cut took place only in the beginning of 1993 
together with a comprehensive reform of capital income taxation. 
At  the  time of the  major  measures  of financial  liberalization,  the  overall 
economic conditions were rather favourable in Finland. The economy had been 
largely unaffected by the second oil shock in the end of the 1970s and had grown at 
a relatively rapid and stable rate over a period of several years. General government 
budget showed slight surplus, and the public sector had hardly any net debt. No major 
need for fiscal  consolidation existed. Tax reforms rather worked in the opposite 
direction. Monetary policy was geared towards maintaining a fixed parity of the 
markka vis-a.-vis  a  trade-weighted basket of currencies  with  a  relatively  small 
fluctuation band. The central bank also succeeded in defending the existing parities 
with exceptionally high interest rates for a short while in the Autumn of 1986. This 
presumably increased the credibility of the fixed exchange rate policy, leading many 
borrowers to discount the possibility of a significant depreciation of markka in the 
near future. 
5.2  The salient features of the cycle 
The financial  liberalization was  followed by an  almost immediate surge of new 
borrowing  by  the  private  sector.  Both  firms  and  households  increased  their 
indebtedness substantially in 1987-1990. In the period of regulation, export industry 
had been favoured in the allocation of credit. The new opportunities opened up by 
financial liberalization concerned thus particularly industries (including services) 
producing for the domestic markets, and the households. Firms invested heavily in 
new capacity in retail trade, hotels and restaurants and recreational facilities, which 
all involved substantial construction activity. For households dwellings remained the 
main object of  investment, although also purchases of  durables and services increased 
strongly. Given the inelastic supply of  land and dwellings, this led early on to a steep 
rise in housing and real estate prices, which boosted households' and firms' wealth 
considerably. 
Expansion of  credit was strongest in the savings bank sector. While bank credit 
about doupled between the end of 1986 and 1990, the rates of growth for the savings 
banks and Skopbank were 120 and 300 per cent, respectively. The difference was 
32 particularly noteworthy in the second half of boom period in 1989 and 1990, when 
the growth of bank credit was  already decelerating. Bank profitability improved 
relative to that of the early 1980s, as revenues increased rapidly while cost growth 
was much more subdued. 
The boost to domestic demand was reinforced by buoyant demand in the western 
export markets in 1988 and  1989. Output responded very strongly; GDP growth 
exceeded 5 per cent in both 1988 and 1989, which brought the unemployment rate 
down  to  slightly  over 3 per cent  in  early  1990.  But also  the  external balance 
weakened, first mainly due to a weakening of  the goods and services account but later 
increasingly due to the increased expenditure on the accumulating foreign debt. 
In response to the very rapid growth of credit, weakening external balance and 
accelerating inflation, monetary policy was tightened in late 1988 and early 1989. 
Markka was effectively revalued by some 4 per cent in March, which led to higher 
short  -term interest rates.  Furthermore,  deposit banks  were  levied  an  extra cash 
reserve requirement up to 4 per cent of deposits and some other funding items to 
penalize the banks, whose lending growth would not decelerate below a target path 
by the end of 1989. Most banks had to  make these zero-yielding deposits at  the 
central bank, but only in the  case of the savings banks they were quantitatively 
significant. The extra reserves were paid back in 1990. 
Stock prices and housing prices peaked in  1989 and credit growth started to 
decelerate. Also activity decelarated rapidly and on year-on-year basis there was no 
growth in 1990. On top of the weakening domestic demand and decelarating growth 
of western export markets, eastern export collapsed with the political turmoil in 
Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries. As a result GDP declined by 
over 7 percent in  1991.  Simultaneously the exchange rate came  under repeated 
speculative attacts and in November 1991  markka was devalued by 12.6 per cent, 
despite record high interest rates. Interest rates remained high, and production and 
asset prices continued to decline in 1992. GDP dropped by a further 3.8 per cent in 
1992 and  in September 1992  markka was  let to  float.  The currency depreciated 
further so that in February 1993 a trade-weighted basket of foreign currencies cost 36 
per cent more than prior to the 1991 devaluation. Output decline started to decelerate 
in 1993 but 1994 was the first year to display positive GDP growth on year-on-year 
basis. Unemployment increased in the process to an unprecedented level of almost 
20 per cent of labour force. The resumption of output growth did not, however, lead 
to a renewed growth of credit. Credit stocks continued to decline through 1994 and 
1995.  Stock prices rebounded  very  strongly but prices  for both residential  and 
commercial property remained historically low still in 1994 and 1995. 
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The dramatic decline in borrower incomes in 1991 and onwards reduced subtantially 
their capacity to  service debt.  Higher short-term rates  increased simultaneously 
nominal debt service burden for many borrowers.  For the borrowers which had 
financed investment with loans denominated in foreign currencies, the burden was 
similarily increased by the depreciation of markka. Many such firms sold primarily 
or solely to the domestic market, so that the exchange rate change failed to have a 
compensating effect on revenues. Not surprisingly an increasing share of borrowers 
became unable to service debt. As banks account for some 2/3 of  the credit risk of the 
private sector - either directly in the form of loans or through guarantees given to 
borrowers using other sources of finance - their loan stocks turned increasingly non-
37 The evolution of the Finnish banking crisis and the measures taken by the authorities are described 
more in detail in Nyberg and Vihriiilii (1994). Koskenkylii (1995) provides international comparisons 
of the extent of banking problems and the costs of bank support policies. 
34 performing, many guarantee obligations were triggered and in due course of time 
unprecedented amounts of  loans had to be written off. 
Figure 3.  Banks' problem assets and credit losses 
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The banking problems started to emerge already in 1989. Higher short-term interest 
rates, declining asset prices, weaker growth of credit and increased credit losses 
weakened bank profitability. Particularly the very expansionary Skopbank, which had 
accumulated significant securities holdings started to see profitability weakening 
through 1989. In 1990 the situation worsened, but most banks still made positive 
profits. Skopbank's difficulties increased, however. Although it managed to show a 
positive profit - thanks to capital gains associated with sales of property - the 
savings banks saw it necessary to increase Skopbank's equity by subscribing new 
shares by FIM 1.3 billion. The authorities put Skopbank on special surveillance. 
In 1991  banks in general  made  loss,  and in September an  acute crisis  of 
confidence in the money market brought Skopbank close to a closure. The Bank of 
Finland took over the bank, injected fresh capital of the order of FIM 2 billion and 
removed  the  assets  with  the  greatest  risks  for  write-offs  to  separate  holding 
companies. The Skopbank rescue was followed by more general measures to support 
the functioning of the banking system in early 1992. The Government announced in 
March an action programme, which consisted of two major support measures. First, 
the Government offered all Finnish deposit banks a capital injection of  FIM 8 billion, 
or some 14 per cent of the regulatory capital of the sector at the end of 1991. The 
offer to each bank was in relation to its risk-weighted assets and off-balance sheet 
commitments. Although the capital instrument - preferred capital certificate - shared 
many features of equity capital, it did not imply government ownership in the banks, 
unless the bank would be unable to meet the conditions set for the capital injection. 
Almost all of the offered 8 billion was in fact subscribed by the banks, even though 
many smaller banks refused the offer.  Second, a wholy new  body,  Government 
Guarantee Fund (GGF) was created with the task "to safeguard the stable functioning 
of the deposit banks and the claims of the depositors" and with an authorization to 
use up to FIM 20 billion for the support operations deemed necessary. 
In 1992 the situation deteriorated rapidly in parts of the banking system. A large 
number of larger savings banks were on the brink of collapse by the Summer. The 
newly created GGF stepped in in June merging the problem banks and a number of 
35 other savings banks to form the Savings Bank of Finland (SBF). In the process 
existing capital was fully written off to cover losses and SBF was transformed into 
a joint-stock company in government ownership. By the end of the year GGF had 
given SBF bank support of the order of FIM 12 billion in the form of purchases of 
preferred capital  certificates  and  subordinated  debt.  In November  1992  also  a 
relatively  small  commercial  bank  STS-bank  came  close  to  a  collapse.38  The 
Government took over the risky assets while the remaining assets were sold to a 
private bank. 
In  the  Winter  1992/93  confidence  in  the  Finnish  economy  weakened 
considerably. The credit ratings of the State of  Finland, major Finnish banks and non-
financial corporations had been lowered several times during 1992, the premium of 
Finnish Government debt in foreign currency rose to almost 1 percentage point by the 
end of the year, and anecdotal evidence suggests that the Finnish banks as well as 
large corporations were unable to borrow from abroad long term and faced significant 
rationing in short-term borrowing as well. To stop the erosion of confidence in the 
banking  system,  the  parliament published  in  February  1993  an  unprecedented 
resolution, in which it undertook to guarantee that the Finnish deposit banks would 
be  able  to  meet  their  contractual  commitments  in  time.39  Simultaneously  the 
government bank support authorization was doubled to FIM 40 billion. 
Through 1993 the situation stabilized but almost all banks continued to make 
substantial loss. Also the prospects of the newly created SBF remained bleak, and the 
Government decided in October 1993 to sell the sound SBF assets to the savings 
banks' four major domestic competitors. The risky assets were transferred to an asset 
management company operating under government guarantee.  Even though the 
overall economic situation improved, banks still made substantial losses both in 1994 
and 1995. 
During the  five-year period  1991  through  1995  the Finnish deposit banks, 
including the government-run asset management companies formed from the failed 
banks' bad assets, posted losses of the order of FIM 66 billion.40 This is over 8 per 
cent of the banks' total assets at the end of 1990 and exceeds clearly the regulatory 
capital of deposit bank groups of FIM 54 billion at the end of 1990. With losses of 
this  magnitude most if not all  banks had failed  without a massive government 
intervention. The total bank support commitment of the authorities (capital injections 
and guarantees) amounted to over FIM 80 billion at the end of 1995. The final cost 
of  the support operations for the public sector has been estimated by the GGF at FIM 
45-55 billion, or some 10 per cent of annual GDP. This is by a large margin the 
highest bank support undertaking in the countries having experienced banking crises 
in the last decade; for example in Sweden the total support commitment amounts to 
some 6 per cent of GDP. 
38 Also STS-bank was originally a savings bank. In the course of the 1980s it nevertheless gradually 
separated itself from other savings banks and it was legally converted into a commercial bank as of 
the beginning of 1990. 
39 The Swedish parliament had adopted a similar resolution already in November 1992. It was in a 
sense an even more radical measure, as  unlike in Finland, there was  no  formal  deposit insurance 
scheme in Sweden. 
40 This overestimates the consolidated losses, as about 4 billion of the losses by the savings banks are 
due to loss of value of their investments in Skopbank. 
36 Table 1.  Banks' cumulative losses and public bank support 1991 through 1995 
Total  Regulatory  Losses 1991 - 1995  Bank support 
assets(TA)  capital 
bill. of  (RCAP)  total (incl. guarantees) 
bill. of  FIM 
31/12/90  FIM 
billions of  %ofTA  % of  billions of 
31/12/90 
FIM  RCAP 
Bank group) 
KOP  164  12.5  11.8  7.2  94.4 
Unitas (SYP)  138  13.6  5.8  4.2  42.6 
Postipankki  97  6.9  2.5  2.6  36.2 
Savings Bank group  1732  10.12,3  34.6  20.0  342.6 
STS-bank  15  lA  3.2  21.3  228.6 
Cooperative Bank group  1342  9.32 ,3  3.7  2.8  39.8 
All deposit banks  7242  54.1  61.62  8.3  116.3 
) Bank groups consolidated 










% of TA  %of  billions of 
RCAP  FIM 
2.1  28.0  1.7 
2.0  19.9  1.7 
0.9  13.0  0.9 
40.6  696.0  42.2 
20.0  214.3  3.0 
1.8  25.8  1.5 
1104  153.0  51.0 
of which paid-out 
% of TA  %of 
RCAP 
1.0  13.6 
1.2  12.5 
0.9  13.0 
24.4  417.8 
20.0  214.3 
1.1  16.1 
7.0  94.3 Bank losses and even more so bank support are very unevenly distributed. The 
savings banks, their central institution Skopbank and the STS-bank (which also was 
a savings bank until the change in the legal form at the beginning of 1990) account 
for over 60 per cent of the banking sector's total losses in 1991 through 1995 and for 
almost 90 per cent of the total bank support commitment of the authorities. 
The banking problems have led to a large-scale restructuring of the banking 
system. As a direct consequence of the solvency problems, more than half of the 
savings bank units of  the time were merged to form the Savings Bank Finland, which 
later was dismantled. The two major commercial (KOP and SYP) merged in the 
beginning of 1995.  Also this  can be seen,  at least in part,  as  a response to  the 
significant depletion of bank capital experienced in the crisis years by these banks, 
particularly by KOP. And all banks have been busy to cut costs by shedding labour, 
closing branches etc. For example, the number of bank employees declined by over 
113 from the peak in 1989 by the end of 1995. 
5.4  Interpreting the cycle 
As noted above, the "financial factors" story can be conceptually decomposed into 
two elements, "the balance sheet mechanism" and "the intermediary mechanism". 
The former  essentially  says  that the  availability  and  cost of external  funds  is 
positively related  to  borrower  net worth.  Thus  spending  is  constrained by  the 
generated internal funds - cash flow - and collateralizable assets, the value of which 
crucially depends on asset prices. The intermediary meachanism says that at least a 
part of borrowers cannot perfectly substitute for intermediary finance, and therefore 
their spending decisions are affected by changes in the supply of  intermediated funds. 
Of course, the two mechanisms are not truly independent but are likely to work 
simultaneously reinforcing each other. In what follows we discuss very briefly the 
likely role of borrower balance sheets and more in depth the likely role of banks' 
credit supply in the credit cycle of 1986 through 1995. 
5.4.1  Borrower balance sheets 
The evolution of many aggregate economic variables in the period of 1985-1995 
certainly is consistent with a balance sheet mechanism in action. The period of rapid 
growth of private investment coincides with a rapid rise in asset values, favourable 
developments of cash flows, rising household incomes. Similarily the deep decline 
in investment is accompanied by falling asset prices, weak cash flow particularly after 
interest payments,  and  decelerating  and  in  the  end  declining  external  finance. 
Correspondingly, residential construction and household expenditure on durables go 
hand in hand with changes in the real price of the main household asset, dwellings. 
38 Figure 4. 
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However, as such these patterns can also be consistent with the standard neoclassical 
explanation: investment is determined by marginal productivity of capital and cost 
of capital (approximated by the tax and inflation adjusted rates of interest). In this 
explanation high asset prices just reflect high future returns on the existing capital 
stock as do high cash flows. And the correlation of credit and investment is purely 
due to demand side effects. More careful analysis is obviously needed. 
Several studies on investment behaviour with Finnish data prior to the financial 
liberalization  suggest  that  private  investment  is  affected  by  cash  flows,  see 
KoskenkyUi. (1985) for an analysis with aggregate data and Peisa and Solttila (1984) 
for an analysis with micro data. However, these results may be mainly due to the 
frictions of intermediation created by regulation, and the doubt remains that variation 
in investment opportunities was not adequately accounted for. 
A couple of recent studies  shed some light on  the determinants  of private 
investment in  the boom-bust  period.  Kajanoja  (1995)  estimates  three  types  of 
investment equations for both manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors with 
quarterly data through the second quarter of 1993. Each of the "flexible accelerator", 
39 "neoclassical" and "Tobin's-q" specifications contains also an indebtedness variable 
(the ratio  of gross  long-term debt to  capital stock).  Kajanoja finds  that for  the 
manufacturing sector indebtedness is of  no consequence. However, investment of  the 
non-manufacturing sector is significantly negatively affected by thedebtratio. And 
even quantitatively the effect on 1993 investment can be assessed non-negligible: 
investment had been 6-15 per cent higher, had the debt ratio been at the 1980 level. 
But,  given the  steadily increasing  debt ratio in  1980  through  1992,  changes in 
indebtedness as  measured in the study cannot explain the rapid growth of non-
manufacturing investment in the late 1980s. 
Brunila (1994) investigates corporate investment with panel data on 280 large 
firms for the years 1985-1992. Investment opportunities are controlled for by sales 
growth and cost of capital by the average rate of interest on existing interest bearing 
liabilities. Both obtain significant coefficients with the expected signs. In addition, 
investment is  affected  positively by cash flow  and  negatively by indebtedness. 
Consistently with the aggregate time series results of Kajanoja, the indebtedness 
variable exerts a more powerful influence on the non-manufacturing firms,  even 
though the effect now is  significant for both types of firms.  The difference may 
reflect the nature of the available collateral assets in the two sectors. The cash flow 
effect is equally important for the two sectors quantitatively as well as in terms of 
statistical significance. Consistently with panel data studies on other countries, the 
effects of  both cash flow and leverage are highly non-linear in the degree ofleverage: 
the impacts are clearly stronger for the high-leverage firms. 
Surveys on management sentiment yield results that are broadly consistent with 
the above econometric findings. Thus in the aftermath of deregulation, with asset 
prices  on  a  steep  rise  and  cash flows  improving,  perception of financing  as  a 
constraint on production was very rare among manufacturing firms. The situation is 
a complete mirrow image some years later.41  Surveys also indicate that availability 
of acceptable collateral has been the most important perceived problem in obtaining 
finance in the time of low asset values. 
41 Actually the share of firms that report that financing is a constraint on production is relatively small 
even  in  the  worst  times.  The  importance  of the  financial  difficulties  of the  firm  sector  may, 
nevertheless, be underestimated in the survey, as the sample covers only manufacturing firms with a 
strong overrepresentation of large enterprises. 
40 Figure 6.  Financial difficulties, interest rates and corporate risk 
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The little data that exist on corporate bond premia suggest that significant risk of 
corporate defaults was started to be perceived in early 1991 with the steep decline of 
production, increasing numbers of bankruptcies and continuous decline of asset 
prices. The secondary market for corporate bonds, thin even in the best of the times, 
more  or  less  disappeared  in  the  winter  1992/93,  suggesting  of extreme  risk 
perception.42  Anecdotal evidence corroborates the message of the corporate risk 
premia: availability of external finance was very tight for even larger corporations in 
the winter 1992/93 to alleviate substantially by the subsequent autumn. 
As a whole, there seems to be little doubt that a balance sheet mechanism has 
been in action in the recent Finnish cycle, even though its exact role is difficult to 
assess. The overall behaviour of  the Finnish economy appears to resemble very much 
that of other countries having been subject to large scale swings in asset prices and 
cash flows recently, see lonung et al. (1994), Borio et al. (1994). 
5.4.2  Intermediary behaviour 
Should the supply of intermediated funds have been a significant factor affecting the 
boom-bust cycle, one would want to find expansionary shocks to intermediaries in 
or prior to the boom period and contractionary shocks in or prior to the bust period. 
For the former financial liberalization provides an obvious potential series of shocks. 
For the contractionary period, several negative shocks can be contemplated:  the 
tighter credit policies of 1989, the tighter capital regulations in 1991  and (for the 
cooperative and savings banks again in 1994), depleation of capital since 1991, the 
resource consuming restructuring and rationalization measures particularly since 
42 Data on secondary market yields of corporate bonds have been collected since 1988, although the 
number  of bonds  for  which  quotations  exist  has  always  been  small.  Furthermore,  the  data  is 
contaminated by the fact that some of the bonds have had bank guarantee. Thus the recorded price 
premia are likely to underestimate the cost of bond finance to the corporates. 
41 1992, and the impact of realized losses and their consequences for bank managers' 
risk attitudes. In addition, the cuts in the tax privileges of bank deposits may have 
made a contribution. 
In what follows the role of banks' credit supply is discussed both in the period 
of rapid growth and the subsequent period of deceleration and decline of credit. We 
consider specifically the composition of firms' and households external finance, the 
issuance of corporate bonds, bank interest margins and an indicator of bank risk. 
After summarizing the aggregate level evidence a brief look is taken at the behaviour 
of individual banks (bank groups). 
Composition of external finance 
When a given class of intermediaries is hit by shocks to any of the above factors, one 
would expect, ceteris paribus, a change in the share of financing provided by this 
source of funds. Similarily one would expect to see a change in the relative price of 
financing. However, the latter is more difficult to identify, given the measurement 
problems associated with the multidimensional nature of financial prices and the 
potential for rationing phenomena. hnportantly, changes in borrower credit quality 
should not imply any change in the share of any single source of finance or its relative 
price, unless a some class of borrowers can rely only on a given source of credit. 
The composition of the firm sector external funds is perhaps the most useful 
piece of financial mix information. As firms  have in principle many alternative 
sources of funds,  the relative contribution of bank financing should change in a 
systematic way when the supply of bank credit is hit by shocks.43 Also the evolution 
of households' credit may be of some interest, although the scarcity of alternatives 
probably makes it difficult to distinguish between demand shocks and shocks to a 
particular type of supply. 
It seems obvious that while the liberalization of  capital controls and lending rates 
and the emergence of the money market implied a positive shock in the supply of 
credit to the private sector in general, it affected most significantly bank lending. 
In part the liberalization of capital movements in 1986 and 1987 eased the direct 
foreign currency borrowing of firms from abroad. But this effect probably was not 
very important as  such,  as  only large firms  could and did resort to  that type of 
financing;  even  in  the  early  1990s  the  firms  borrowing  directly  from  abroad 
numbered under 100. And these large firms had even earlier been granted licences for 
capital import. A more important immediate consequence of the liberalization of 
capital controls was that banks could now intermediate long-term foreign-currency 
financing from abroad to their corporate customers. Thus the liberalization of capital 
controls provided banks a new source of funds to finance supply of credit. 
Similarily, the emerging money market benefited probably more banks' financing 
possibilities than the availability or cost of short-term credit for firms  from the 
securities market. Only large firms can use commercial paper, at least without credit 
43 There are two problems of measurement which may distort the evolution of the mix of particularly 
the firm  sector external finance,  as  the net changes have to  be calculated from  the stocks.  First, 
exchange rate changes, particularly since 1991  change the markka values of the stock without any 
effect on financial flows. Second, the effect of write-offs must also be estimated. These have been 
taken into account in Figure 7. 
42 enhancement by the banks, and these firms had very likely faced the least constraints 
on short-term credit earlier. Finally, the abolition of the lending rate controls also 
eased banks' credit pricing while leaving other sources of credit unaffected. 
Consistently with these predictions about the effects of financialliber.alization, 
the composition of firms' external finance moved strongly towards bank finance in 
1987 and 1988. Most of the substantial growth comes from this source. In 1987 this 
may have been partly due to "reintermediation" as financing moved back to banks' 
balance sheets from the finance companies owned by the banks. These companies had 
expanded rapidly in a couple of preceeding years as  a way to cirmumvent the still 
existing lending rate regulation.  But also in  1988  bank lending was  by far  the 
dominant element of overall credit expansion. 
Figure 7.  Firms' external finance 
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The growth of private sector credit started to  show some deceleration from  the 
beginning of 1989, but firms' external finance (mainly credit) nevertheless increased 
quite robustly in 1989 and almost all year 1990. However, the share of bank credit 
declined in both years, suggesting that the supply of this type of finance became in 
relative terms more scarce. The introduction of the special cash reserve requirement 
is a readily available explanation for the relative decline of  bank lending in 1989, but 
probably not anymore in 1990 when the cash reserve deposits were paid back. 
In 1990, supply of may have been constrained by the imminent tightening of 
capital regulations in the beginning of 1991. But this shock to the supply of bank 
credit may have been less important for the  share of bank loans than two  other 
factors. First, possibilities of direct foreign finance improved as constraints on the 
sales  of markka bonds abroad  were lifted.  Second,  finance  from the  insurance 
companies in  the form  of relending  of pension contributions  became attractive 
43 relative to bank credit, as the regulated price of this finance did not increase along 
with the general level of interest rates.44 
In the first year of declining output 1991, bank lending to firms came to a virtual 
standstill,  while  borrowing  from  other  financial  institutions, . particularly  from 
insurance companies continued at  a relatively robust pace.  Again the continued 
relative decline of the price of insurance company relending may account for a part 
of the decline in the share of  bank lending. However, no obvious positive shocks can 
be attributed to the other alternatives to bank credit. Thus it is likely that the supply 
of bank credit was hit by a negative shock. As already noted, the tightened capital 
regulation is one such potential shock. But it cannot be excluded that also prospects 
of loss of capital due to weak profitability played a role as well, given the increasing 
amounts of non-performing loans and bankruptcies through the year. 
In 1992, bank credit contracted strongly while stocks of other types of credit 
remained largely unchanged. A strong negative shock to the supply of bank credit 
looks therefore likely. Given the unprecedented losses of the banks as a whole and 
a complete wiping-out of the capital of the savings banks, capital insufficiency is a 
natural candidate cause of the decline.45 In addition, the restructuring going on in the 
savings bank sector may have negatively affected credit supply. At the latest in 1992 
senior bank managers probably also  had become aware  that large losses imply 
significant changes in bank management; risk attitudes probably changed as a result. 
In 1993  the picture started to change as  large firms  increased their external 
funding from the bond market and the stock market. Also in 1994 large firms raised 
subtantial  amounts  of equity  capital.  Bond  financing  nevertheless  collapsed, 
presumably in response to the steep rise of long-term interest rates in the Spring. 
Bank lending continued to decline in both years, however. But so did borrowing from 
other financial intremediaries and in 1994 also directly from abroad. Although in 
1993  a  further  decline  of the  supply  of bank credit looks  quite  possible,  and 
presumably for the same reasons as in 1992, also other factors very likely contributed. 
In particular, the open sector dominated by large corporations started to  recover 
improving corporate cash flows and balance sheets with a positive effect on their 
creditworthiness. On the other hand, the non-manufacturing sector dominated by 
small businesses continued to be depressed, with demand for credit and borrower 
quality weak. This asymmetry - most likely not present during the early phase of the 
recession - may imply that low demand for all types of intermediated credit and the 
44 The automatic relending of pension contributions is a special feature of the Finnish earnings related 
pension system. The firms that make their pension contributions are entitled to borrow 2/3  of the 
contributions at regulated rates, provided they have acceptable collateral to provide. In 1990, finding 
adequate collateral (bank or equivalent guarantees, good real estate collateral) did not seem to be a 
problem. Banks and a government agency selling such guarantees started to raise their guarantee fees 
only in 1991. The median fee for manufacturing firms of 50 basis points in 1989 and 1990 more than 
doubled to 120 basis points by 1993. 
45  It seems rather clear that by the first half of 1992, banks had become aware that huge losses of 
capital cannot be avoided. Prospects for raising private capital were weak for even the banks that in 
principle could issue equity and corresponding tier-I capital instruments. Furthermore, although the 
Government had promised a capital injection of FIM 8 billion into the Finnish banks, its terms were 
regarded as rather stiff in the banking community. And the terms, at which additional support would 
be available from the GGF - although not well articulated by the authorities - were considered very 
harsh. The treatment of the Savings Bank of Finland in the Autumn of 1992 very likely confirmed 
these conjectures. 
44 weak  quality of the borrowers  dependent on  such  credit were  the  reasons  for 
declining bank and other intermediated credit in 1993 and particularly in 1994. 
The  composition  of  household  borrowing  is  consistent  with  the  above 
interpretation of firm sector borrowing mix. Inthe wake of the early measures of 
deregulation, bank lending to households increased rapidly while other financing was 
relatively modest. However, since 1989 the contribution and share of bank loans 
declined, falling to essentially zero in 1991, just as  in the firm sector. And from 
thereon households' borrowing from the banks has declined. However, as noted, the 
information value of household borrowing composition is likely to be less than that 
of the  firms.  The  main  alternative  sources  for  households  are  namely  various 
subsidized public credit schemes - chiefly for housing. Given their advantageous 
terms, these loan facilities are usually used up to the regulated maximum. Bank loans 
are thus a more expensive residual source of finance. Therefore change in the mix is 
likely to reflect more the overall demand conditions than the relative supplies. 
Figure 8.  Household credit 
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Also the evolution of gross issues of corporate bonds fits well to the above story 
about  shocks  to  bank credit  supply.  Despite  the  rapid  overall credit growth in 
1987 - 1988, bond emissions in fact declined. They started to increase in the same 
time  as  bank lending was  decelerating in the  wake  of the special  cash reserve 
requirement in 1989. And the rapid growth (relative to earlier years) continued in 
1990-1993.  Although  in  part  this  may  have  been  due  to  the  noted  lifting  of 
restrictions on the sales of markka denominated bonds, substitution for increasing 
scarce bank lending cannot be excluded as a reason.46 
46 However. only a small fraction of bonds have ever been issued by non-listed corporations without 
bank or equivalent guarantee.  Thus  bond  finance  has  been  a true  alternative to  bank and  other 
intermediary loans for a very small corporate segment only. 
45 Figure 9.  Issues of corporate bonds 
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As noted, the decline in bond issues in 1994 probably was due to the sharp increase 
in long-tenn interest rates in the Spring 1994. But also easing of  borrowing needs due 
to strong cash flows of the large (mainly export orientated) corporations that can 
borrow in the bond market in the first place was a likely factor. At any rate, resorting 
to the bond market was not necessary to replace potentially lacking finance from 
banks. The general improvement of the  availability of finance  and its  tenns is 
supported also the surveys about management sentiment discussed earlier. 
Price data 
Bank  margins  (the  differences  between  lending  and  funding  rates)  may  be 
infonnative about the relative roles of supply and demand shocks. In the absence of 
rationing phenomena and assuming the borrower quality constant, an outward shift 
in the demand for bank loans should raise the margin, ceteris paribus, and outward 
shift in the supply should lower the margin, ceteris paribus. 
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The margin between the average rate on the bank loan stock (markka loans) and the 
average  funding  cost  (markka  funding),  for  which  data  exist  even  prior  to 
deregulation, declines from 1987 until 1990, and increases thereafter until late 1993, 
after which it again has been on a downward path.47  The time path suggests that 
positive  supply  shocks  were  dominant  from  the  times  of major  liberalization 
measures until at least the peaking of loan growth around the year shift 1988/89, 
which coincides with the bottoming out of  the average ex post real rate on new loans. 
This margin also suggests that the decline of loan growth in 1989 and 1990 reflected 
equally slackening demand as  declining supply, while in 1991  through late 1993 
negative supply shocks dominated. From 1993 onwards weakness of demand more 
than weakness of supply is suggested as the cause of declining bank credit. 
Unfortunately the overall interest magin is moved also by changes in the yield 
curve. A better indicator of the relevant relative price of bank credit may be the 
margin between the average rate applied to new loans linked to a given money market 
rate and the relevant reference rate. The most representavive such margin is the one 
between the variable-rate loans with the linkage to the three-month money market 
rate, data on which exist from mid-1987. It behaves somewhat differently but leads 
broadly to  the same conclusions as  the overall margin of markka intermediation. 
Despite a very rapid growth of credit until the end of 1988, this margin did not rise 
but if anything showed a marginally declining trend. From some time in 1989 until 
mid 1993 this margin was on the rise to decline thereafter again. The main difference 
between the two margins is  that the margin on new loans suggests that negative 
supply shocks dominated declining demand already from 1989. 
The conclusions based on interest rate  margins  have,  nevertheless  several 
caveats, which need to be kept in mind. The most important problem is that not only 
shocks to the supply of credit and shocks to the willingness of  the potential borrowers 
to borrow (pay for loans) move the margin. Also borrower quality is reflected in the 
47  A steep temporary hike in  the margin can be observed towards the end of 1990. It presumable 
reflects more or less solely the effects of the expected change in the taxation of interest incomes on 
deposits in January 1991. A substantial part of the maturing long-term tax free deposits with relati vely 
high rates were not renewed in 1990 but the funds were left in low-yielding transactions accounts to 
wait for the new high-yielding savings outlets subject to a low source tax. 
47 margin. Thus low margins in the growth period and high margins in the contraction 
period may reflect (perceived) good borrower quality in the good times and bad 
quality in the bad times rather than changes in supply. The only way to distinguish 
between the two is to explicitely analyze borrower quality, which hardly can be done 
with aggregate data. Fortunately there exists a micro data study about this period. 
Murto (1994) investigates the pricing of bank loans with data on some 1900 
savings bank customers in the period of 1987 - 1992. He finds that after controlling 
for  many characteristics of the borrowers (and also  some characteristics of the 
lending banks) the margin over and above the reference rate was lower in the boom 
years than in the early crisis period covered by the study. This is consistent with our 
aggregate observation that margins were on the decline during the boom years and 
on the increase during the early crisis years. It thus supports the above conclusion that 
supply shocks are at least in part behind the margin movement both in the boom 
period and in the crisis years. 
A second problem is that the increase in the margins in 1989-1993 is likely to 
underestimate both the weakening of  borrower quality and tightening of  credit supply. 
First, adverse selection and moral hazard problems are likely to be more important 
in bad times than in good times. Therefore rationing as a means to control for them 
is likely to increase in bad times. Second, the loans extended in the crisis period 
include also renegotiated loans to ailing customers. Often times renegotiation implies 
lower rates. Thus the rates applied to other (healthy, new) customers must be clearly 
higher than the average rates, while such a difference is unlikely to exist in good 
times. 
Another type of price data concerns the risk premia applied to banks' uninsured 
funding. For the Finnish banks such data of reasonable quality exist only for 5-year 
bonds guaranteed by the banks, the yields of which can be compared with the yieds 
of corresponding government debt.  The time series of such a spread variable is 
broadly consistent with the pattern of  the private sector financing mix. U ntillate 1989 
there was no systematic bank credit risk over and above the government risk. In late 
1989 through early 1992 the yield premium howered at arount 0.5 percentage point 
to increase in 1992 to clearly over 1 percentage point. Thus in the period of rapid 
expansion, no premium can realiably be observed while in the period of  deceleration 
and contraction the premium was high.48 
48  The behaviour of this measure of bank risk is somewhat puzzling in 1994, however. It seems to 
increase even though banks in the same time reported of easing financial conditions, and banks' 
relative share in corporate borrowing did not decline anymore. The main factor is likely to be that the 
rapid growth of bank deposits (subject 100 % deposit insurance) made banks less dependent on 
purchased funds. Thus even though buyers of money market instrument may have attached a higher 
default premium than before, banks lending opportunities have not been constrained by finance as 
deposit funding has been plentiful. In part also the decline in the sovereign risk of the State of Finland 
could explain why the increase in the bank - State of Finland spread is not reflected in the perceived 
difficulties of funding in the banking sector. 
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A preliminary conclusion 
Based  on  aggregate  level  observations  about  the  composItIOn  of firms'  and 
households external finance,  the corporate bond market and price data on  bank 
lending and funding, a tentative interpretation emerges about the evolution of  banks' 
credit supply. 
Starting in 1987, financial liberalization was followed by an outward shift in the 
supply of bank lending. The positive supply shocks dominated until some time in 
1989. After the peaking of the growth rate of bank lending at the end of 1988, both 
demand and supply schedules started to mowe inward. Through 1990, the last year 
of overall growth of credit, negative supply shocks increased in importance, and 
continued to contribute to the decline of  credit at least in 1991 and 1992, perhaps also 
in 1993. From 1993 onwards weak demand and questionable borrower quality were 
likely to be behind the continued decline of the stock of bank loans. 
The  patterns  of lending  growth  and  interest  margins  suggest  that  in  the 
expansion phase financial liberalization very likely increased bank lending rather 
directly through the impact on the availability and cost of banks' refinancing both in 
the domestic money market and in the foreign capital market.  But whether moral 
hazard associated with potentially underpriced bank liabilities or changes in banks' 
lending  policies  due  to  increased  competition  or  simply  myopic  expectations 
contributed to the speed of credit growth cannot be assessed on the basis of the 
aggregate observations.  Excluded it is  not.  At any  rate,  the  findings  by Vesala 
(1995b) suggest that bank competition increased in the second half of the 1980. 
Similarily, in the contraction phase several potential explanations exist for a 
leftward shift in the banks'  credit supply.  Tightening of capital regulations, the 
substantial depletion of bank capital, changed risk attitudes and disturbances caused 
by restructuring are all possible explanations of the negative supply shocks in this 
period. Thus, in particular,  a credit crunch due to bank capital problems seems 
possible in  1991  and  1992.  The results of the only study that  has  attempted to 
discover a relationship between bank capital and  lending with Finnish data are 
consistent with this  conjecture.  Following the  approach of Bernanke and Lown 
(1991),  Solttila  and  VihriliHi  (1992)  find  a  statistically  significant  negative 
49 relationship between the growth of lending by individual savings banks in 1991 and 
their projected capital adequacy indicator. However, the effect was even smaller than 
that found by Bemanke and Lown. Furthermore, the analysis suffers from a very 
inadequate treatment of the potential demand factors,  and there is  no  attempt to 
account for differences in borrower quality. 
A glance beyond the aggregates: diversity of bank behaviour and risk taking 
The overall evolution of bank credit hides very disparate speeds of credit extension 
by different banks. As noted, the savings bank group (the savings banks and their 
central bank Skopbank) expanded credit far faster than its competitors in the boom 
period. The difference is particularly pronounced in 1989, when the savings banks 
continued  rapid  expansion  while  the  other  banks  already  decelarated  lending 
significantly.  This  is  clearly  problematic  from  the  point  of view  of the  above 
hypothesis that financial liberalization as such is the only positive supply shock of the 
boom period. The new opportunities to finance credit expansion were open to all 
banks. 
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One can argue that the development of the money market favoured particularly the 
savings banks and the cooperative banks which did not have a direct access to central 
bank facilities.  These two  classes  of banks  may  also  have  obtained  particular 
advantage from  the liberalization of capital controls, as  these banks' traditional 
clienteles (households and small businesses) had not earlier had any access to foreign 
borrowing unlike the large industrial firms which relied on commercial banks for 
their bank finance.  But even these explanations fall  short of accounting for  the 
observed differences  among  banks.  In particular,  they  do  not  explain  why  the 
cooperative banks did not seize the new opportunities as the savings banks did. 
Another important  aspect  about  credit  growth becomes  obvious  when  the 
differences  among  banks  are  considered:  rapid  growth  was  very  risky.  A clear 
positive relationship exists between the materialized risks in the crisis period and the 
speed  of credit  expansion  in  the  boom  period_  The  savings  banks  (including 
50 Skopbank) expanded far faster than other major banks, and ended up with largest 
shares of problem assets. 
Figure 13. 
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An analysis of individual savings and cooperative banks confirms this conclusion. 
Solttila  and  Vihriala  (1994)  find  that  even  after  controlling  for  the  sectoral 
composition of bank lending and a number of other factors,  the speed of credit 
growth in the boom period is the main factor to explain the bankwise differences in 
the share of problem assets in the crisis period. Among the savings banks hardly any 
other factor is of importance. 
The moral hazard explanation of excessive risky lending would require that the 
banks, which took most risk were also banks with weakest net worth. In fact, this 
seems to be the case in the Finnish credit boom of the late 1980s. Plotting the rate of 
growth of bank lending in the second half of the 1980s against the average operating 
profit of the in the first half of the 1980 shows that the bank groups which chose to 
expand  lending  most  also  were  the  bank  groups  with  the  weakest  underlying 
profitability (Figure 14).49 The most expansive savings bank group stands out also as 
the least profitable one. 
A popular explanation of the rapid growth of lending by the Finnish savings 
banks in the 1980s is that the savings banks tried to overcome what was perceived 
to be a serious profitability problem in the early 1980s by expanding the scale of 
operation in order to lower unit costs. A good opportunity to do so was perceived 
when deregulation lifted constraints on non-deposit funding as  well as unleashed 
repressed demand for credit.  Kuustera (1995)  provides ample documentation of 
decisions consistent with this hypothesis. 
How does this explanation square with the moral hazard explanation? At a first 
glance, the "lower unit costs through growth" story would seem to be very different 
from the moral hazard hypothesis and the related managerial theories. The moral 
49 The operating profit excludes depreciation, extraordinary items and taxes, the two of which have 
varied a great deal in part to minimize taxes. Operating profit is likely to be the best available measure 
of a bank's underlying profitability and thereby also "charter value". 
51 hazard  hypothesis  explains  rapid  growth  of lending  by  deliberate  risk-taking 
facilitated by inadequate pricing of  bank funding while the popular explanation refers 
to reduction of unit costs through growth and is silent about credit risk. But the two 
stories share essential features. Both require that the lenders to the banks do not  price 
the funds they provide too high, otherwise financing the new business opportunities 
would not be profitable. The stories share also the prediction that high costs imply 
more lending. The only real difference is whether the bankers perceived lending to 
be risky or not. Should one assume that bankers always are aware that lending is 
associated with credit risk, one might actually regard the two stories as essentially the 
same. 
But banks differ also in other respect than just costs or underlying profitability. 
In particular clientiles are different in terms of  geopraphicallocation and sector. Such 
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Also  the  deceleration and contraction  of credit took place rather differently in 
different banks. Following the slower than average deceleration of lending in 1989 
and 1990, the savings banks cut lending very strongly in 1991 and in 1992.50 Given 
that these banks faced the gravest capital adequacy problems, a capital crunch seems 
a possible explanation (Figure 15). But equally well a credit crunch for other reasons 
than capital insufficiency is possible. The savings bank group also was subject to the 
most stringent supervisory actions of all banks, as Skopbank was taken over by the 
Bank of Finland in 1991 and a major part of the individual savings banks ended up 
in  government ownership in  1992.  As  a  result,  additional  risk taking  by these 
institutions  was  presumably  strongly  constrained  and  the  radical  restructuring 
measures of these failed  institutions  may have disturbed their lending business 
significantly. 
But, as noted different banks have had somewhat different clienteles as well, and 
this may at least partly explain the observed bank-wise differences. In particular, the 
savings banks may have had more customers in the sectors and areas most severly hit 
50 After 1992 assessing the evolution of credit by individual institutions is difficult given the drastic 
changes in the banking structure. 
52 by the recession: real estate and services sectors and towns and regions which grew 
most rapidly in the boom period. Thus both demand (customers' willingness to pay 
for credit) and borrower quality may have declined more among the savings banks 
than amomg other banks. Clearly, to isolate the effect of  bank capital and other bank 
characteristics, these factors have to be incorporated into the analysis. 
Figure 15.  Capital ratios and lending growth in the early 1990s 
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Real effects of bank lending? 
Even if the it could be established that banks' credit supply has been hit by significant 
shocks either in the boom period or in the bust period or both, such shocks may not 
be important from the point of view of real outcomes. First, hardly any agent is fully 
dependent on bank credit.  It is  indeed clear from the data reported above  that 
substitution has taken place. The question thus is to what extent substitution can and 
does mitigate the effects on real decisions of shocks to banks' supply of credit. 
Second, variation in spending due to other factors than the cost and availability of 
external finance may be quatitatively much larger than that due to these financial 
factors. 
The traditionally predominant position of deposit banks as sources of funds for 
the private sector in Finland suggests that the scope for substitution must be much 
less in Finland than, say, in the United States. Shocks to banks' credit supply should 
thus be more powerful in Finland. Given that even some studies with recent US data 
have found quantitatively significant real consequences of banking problems, one 
would expect that at least in the distress period of the 1990s shocks to banks' credit 
supply could have had observable effects on spending. However, precisely in the 
same time the borrower quality and probably willingeness to borrow also declined. 
Thus,  as  noted  earlier,  analysis  that  combines  borrower  quality  and  bank 
characteristics is needed. That requires in practice firm level (preferebly panel) data. 
But some insight into the role of bank credit may also be gained from aggregate 
analysis. Saarenheimo (1995) provides a relevant such exercise. He examines in a 
V  AR framework the relative roles of  money (M2) and bank loans (the sum of  markka 
and foreign currency loans to the private sector) in the determination of private fixed 
investment with data of the first quarter 1970 through the second quarter 1994. The 
basic result of the analysis is that, even after allowing for the contribution of money 
53 stock  and  the  loan rate,  bank credit exerts  a  significant independent  effect  on 
investment  in  dynamic  simulations.  Money  and  credit  are  strongly 
contemporaneously correlated but the importance of credit remains even if all of  this 
correlation is attributed to shocks in money. However, money loses all of its effects 
on investment if the "ordering" is the other way round. 
Simulations in which the shocks to credit are set to zero from a given quarter 
onwards suggest that had no credit shock taken place since 1986:3, investment had 
hardly increased in the boom years and had ended up in 1993  and 1994 slightly 
higher than in reality.  Zeroing the shocks  since  1989: 1 would have  resulted in 
subtantially higher investment in all years 1990 through 1994. However, if only the 
shocks since 1990:3 had been eliminated, the deviation of investment from the true 
path had been much smaller. 
Figure 16.  Private investment; actual and simulated 
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Conditional on the  assumption that the  estimated shocks to  bank credit indeed 
represent supply shocks, Saarenheimos results suggest that changes in the supply of 
bank credit can explain a substantial part of both the rapid growth and steep decline 
of investment in the boom-bust period. However, in the years of the banking crisis 
shocks  to  credit  supply  appear  to  have  been  of relatively  modest  magnitude. 
Furthermore,  in  the  light of earlier discussion,  it is  unlikely  that  all  shocks  to 
Saarenheimos credit equation are due to changing bank behaviour. Thus in particular 
the quantitative significance of a "credit crunch" caused by banking problems may 
have been limited. 
54 5.5  Conclusions 
There is little doubt that a "financial accelerator" based on the borrower balance sheet 
quality and cash flow has played a role in the makings of the credit cycle of Finland 
in  1986~  1994. Given the highly non-linear effects predicted by theory, the balance 
sheet  mechanism  can  be  assumed  to  have  been  especially  important in  the 
transformation of the economic downturn into a deep and long recession. 
However,  more research needs  to  be  done  to assess the importance of the 
weakening of firm and household balance sheets and cash flows  relative to  the 
standard mechanisms of cyclical variation based on interest rates and income and 
profitability expectations. Given the nature of the balance sheet factors, the best 
insights probably can be gained by analyzing micro data rather than aggregate time 
series alone. 
In the light of aggregate and some bank-group level observations, it seems also 
plausible  that  changes  in  the  credit  supply  of financial  intermediaries  have 
contributed to the credit cycle. Financial liberalization undoubtedly created a positive 
shock to the supply of  bank credit. Similarily, a series of  negative supply shocks seem 
capable of explaining at least a part of the decline in bank credit subsequently, ie. a 
credit crunch is quite possible. 
But many issues remain unclear.  Why was  the reaction of credit growth to 
liberalization so  strong and why was it so  unequal among the banks? Were the 
obvious  impulses  stemming  from  better  financing  possibilities  augmented  by 
distorted incentives to take excessive risks? Some broad observations suggest that 
such moral hazard may have been in action. 
Similarily the period of declining bank credit is associated with many questions. 
Although the preliminary aggregate level analysis gives some support to the credit 
crunch hypothesis, its importance relative to the balance sheet mechanism is very 
difficult to establish, particularly as borrower quality weakened in the same time as 
banks' credit supply was hit by potentially important negative shocks. Even less can 
immeadiately be said about the relative importance of the potential causes of a credit 
crunch. 
Understanding the role of the banks in the credit cycle clearly requires further 
analysis. Given the nature of the problem such analysis hardly can be conducted with 
aggregate data. Again examination of the behaviour of individual banks over the 
period of interest is required. 
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